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The objective of this study is to make a normative assessment
of certain factors that have affected the pace and level of national
integration before the pre-coup period of 1966.
Neither Ghana nor Nigeria is a nation state in any strict sense
of the term. The institutions through which the administrations of
the two states function are nearly all foreign in ideology, the states
frontiers are legacies of colonial regimes, and even the English
language used in administration and government is not indigenous.
Each state is a political unit embracing many cultures and language
groups. These differ within one state as do the cultural-lingual
groups among the nations of Europe. The existence of these diverse
groups coupled with the legacy of colonial rule presents a tremendous
internal challenge to the new countries. Thus the task of the politi
cal leaders in these countries is to minimize tensions within these
groups so as to build a single popular political institution from a
multiplicity of traditional societies.
In the process of rebuilding these nations, hereinafter referred
to as national integration, the centrifugal pull of regional and local
interests and ambitions have repeatedly threatened the unity of
national-political and social institutions built during colonial
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rule. In the light of this, it would be appropriate to isolate and
disciiss in greater detail some of the ramifications of national
integration.
Purpose and Scope
After a detailed survey of the literature on developing countries,
it has been possible to isolate the following underlying problems of
national integration in Ghana and Nigeiria: traditionalism; colonial
legacy, political parties; and neocolonialism. Thus, the scope and
purpose of this \Aiole study is geared toward establishing a causal
relationship between these variables and the problems of national
integration.
To accomplish the aforementioned objective, it is necessary:
firstly, to define the concept of national integration and second, to
indicate the nature of the variables and show how they relate to each
other, and thirdly, to show the relationship between these variables
and the level of integration in Ghana and Nigeria.
The Concept of National Integration
National integration has had varied interpretations and definitions,
as a few illustrations will indicate. To people such as Claude Ake,
national integration has a dual related problem ~ "how to elicit from
subjects of a nation deference and devotion to the claims of the state,
and how to increase normative consensus governing political behavior
among members of the political system.”^ Both Leonard Binder and Karl
^Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Illinois: Dorsey
Press, 1967), pp.1-13*
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Bentsch conceptualize the process of creating intrastate consensus,
especially, the bridging of the elite-mass gape, as national integra¬
tion. And for other persons, such as James E. Coleman and Carl G.
Roseberg, the concept subsumes two auxiliary processes: first, poli¬
tical integration, which refers to the "progressive building of the
elite-mass gape in the vertical plane, and second, territorial integra¬
tion which refers to progressive reduction of cultural and regional
discontinuitives and tensions in the process of creating a homogeneous
territorial community.For analytical purposes, Coleman's and
Roseberg's concept of national integration will be used.
Traditionalism
This term will refer to the indigenous socio-political institu¬
tions. The main objective in this chapter will be to examine the
structure and functions of the indigenous political system as it
existed in the pre-colonial days. In analysis, it will be discovered
that the family unit, traditional religion, kingship and lineage were
all units of government, and also seirved as integrative influences in
the traditional societies. The societies of Yoruba and Akan will
serve as illustrations.
Colonial Legacy
This term is used only in a limited sense. For the purpose of
this study, colonial legacy refers to the social-political institution —
inter alia, English language, territorial boundaries, legal and admini¬
strative practices, and the economic systems — which Ghana and Nigeria
^J. S. Coleman and Carl G, . Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties and
National Integration in Tropical Africa (Los Angeles: University of
California, Los Angeles, Press, 1961:), p.9. See also Ake, op.cit., p.l3»
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inherited from colonial rule.
Political Parties
This term refers to organized groups, such as the Convention
People's Party (CPP), National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC)
and Action Group (AG), irtiich were instrumental in winning political
independence and which, subsequently, undertook to ameliorate the
conditions described in colonial legacy. To give a better perspective
of the roles of the political parties in either promoting or inhibit¬
ing national integration in Ghana and Nigeria, the roles of the
parties in the national life from approximately 1950 to 19b5 will be
described and analyzed and, by means of self-constructed criteria,
the extent to which national integration has been the function of the
parties in each country will be evaluated. In the light of this, the
author presents below some of these criteria in the form of questions:
1. Do political parties follow ethnic and regional lines?
2. Have the political leaders been able to devise some means of
arousing psychologically national consciousness, e.g«, ideology and
national symbols?
3. Are there cultural symbols and historical experiences that
can be exploited for reinforcing social solidarity?
li. How do the powers snd influences of traditional elites
compare with the secular elites?
5. Do the masses perceive the parties as improving their lots?
6. To idiat extent is changing the level and pace of economic
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modernization the function of the political parties?^
Neocolonialism
A central thesis of some scholars and statesmen is that the
former metropoles have retained considerable political power in this
former territory by judiciously manipulating these economic holdings
in the newly independent countries. Such practices are sometimes
derisively referred to as neocolonialism. This ch^ter will explore
the relationship between neocolonialism and national integration.
Before discussing in greater detail the relationship between
the aforementioned variables and the level of national integration in
Ghana aid Nigeria, it will be necessary to identify briefly the two
countries.
Nigeria
Nigeria is dominated by three main cultural groups, Hausa-Fulani,
Ibo and Yoruba, which correspond closely to the main geographical and
regional structures of the Federation. These three groups express
themselves in the three main political parties. National Council of
Nigeria Citizens, Action Group and Northern Peoples Party. In the
Noridi, the cultural group, Hausa-Fulana, is dominant, even though the
two groups involved have certain racial differences. Fulanis are
descendants of the white Berbers} however, through intermarriage between
the Hausas and Fulani and aided by the Muslim religion, there has
^Each of the above criteria has been used by one writer or another
in appraising the effect of political parties' influences in the new
nations. These are meant to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.
Taken together, the criteria may help appraise the relative degree
of success the parties have achieved in promoting national integration
in (^hana and Nigeria.
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emerged a single culture of authority esqpressed through NPC. Socially,
colonial rule, through the practice of "indirect rule," and the Muslim
religion have made the North the least developed of the three regions
of Nigeria.^ In the Eastern region, the southeastern part of Nigeria,
the Ibo are dominant. The region is characterized by an almost coirqplete
absence of any Muslim Influence. Christianity and animistic tradition¬
al religion are the dominant religions (see Figure 1).
The Ibo never developed a monarchial form of government as did the
Yoruba and Hausa societiesj instead, they ruled themselves in the pre¬
colonial days through elders and age-grades. Aided by their dynamic
culture and coupled with their quick adaptations to colonial situations,
the Ibo have emerged as pioneers in education and the professions and
as skilled craftsmen. Their emigration to other parts of the country
made them Ihe first Nigerian nationalists.
In the Vfest, the Yorubas are the dominant group, their society
dating back as far as 9 A.D. Their kingdoa, the Cyo En5)ire, flourished
in the sicteenth century; however, through internicine wars, the empire
split into four states with the Northern state coming under Hausa-
Fulani influence. Kingship, clan ancestral worship, and lineage were
characteristics of the Yoruba society, and these were strong integra¬
tive influences.2
Ghana
At first glance, it appears that Ghana, similar to Nigeria, can







also be divided In Northezni and Southern cultural groups. Although
the northern part of Ghana resembles the savannah zone of Nigeria, It
Is quite distinct from the southern part. The people speak almost
similar languages. Islam is also strong. The people in the North
constitute less than one fifth of the total population of Ghana. In
the southern part of Ghana Is the Akan group, which occupies almost
all of the forest zone and some of the savannah north and south of It
— about one third of the area of Ghana. Since the Akans also straddle
the areas devoted to cocoa produciiion ana gold mining, Ghana's major
exporting activities, they control a preponderance ©f the country's
wealth. In spite of this cultural euid linguistic homogeneity, there
are other historic groups within the Akans, i.e., the Ashanti and Fantis,
whose historic divisions have affected Ghana's post-independence politi¬
cal develqpments. In brief, the unchallenged dominance of the South,
coupled with the cultural^linguistic homogeneity of the Akans has meant
that national unity in Ghana could possible be more thorough than in
Nigeria, which needs to reconcile powerful regionally-based cultural
groups.^ (See Figure 2.)
^For a detailed discussion on the subject, see David Kimble, A







THE T&m.lL(mL POLITICAL OSGANIZATXC^
In this chapter the lerel of political crga&izati<m attained
hy tradi^wial societies of Ghana and Kigeria in the preocolonlal days
will be sarveyed* In this case, the aathcr sill attempt to do the
following t discuss and analyse the Akan system of political organisatioa
by pointing out ^e nature of traditicnal gorernmoit, tiie decision-making
mechanism and Um role of chieftaincy in the qrstemi contrast the
Xoruba tra(U.tional systma with tbs Akan and lypoint out the differences
between the two* This siU enable tte reader to get an idea of the
integratire influences in the traditional political system.
The Akan System^
It would be ia^ossible to comprehend the substance of p^itical
integration without soae understanding of the indigenous system upon
idiii^ the secular structures depend. The traditi.«ial pcd.itieal organi¬
sation forms the base point from idiich this analysis will proceed.
The particular form of trauTi'yi.onal society which will be dealt
iThe Akan of Ghana represent som two thirds of the seren and
one half million pec^le of Ghana. They are to be found in Ashanti
and tlw South, in Axis and to just west of Accra. They speak a cluster




with here may be called tribal.^ For the purpose of this study, the
Ashanti political organization as a representative system will be used,
since it is probably the most highly developed of any to be found in
Ghana. Also, there is a larger amount of literature on the Ashanti
system than there is on any other highly organized ethnic group in
Ghana.
Ii^ith the development of Ashanti suzerainty over large areas of
Ghana between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ashanti
system developed into a dominating bureaucracy, more like a huge corpora¬
tion of semi-independent divisions than like a fcrrmal kingdom. Yet at
the center, wielding unchallenged power, was the King of Ashanti, the
Asantehene. A highly differentiated system of councils, a bureaucracy
and a court, surrounded by the Golden Stool, the symbol of Ashanti
nationhood, prevailed. The question may be asked at this point --
how did the Ashanti system emerge?
The Ashanti Confederacy
The Ashanti Confederacy, or the Ashanti Union, has two histori¬
cal epochs: the pre-Feyiase and the post-Feyiase periods.^
As used here, “tribal* is a restricted term referring to a parti¬
cular form of social organization, the basis of which is the recognition
and integration kingship structures as the matrix of the social system.
Tribal society in Ghana was an amalgamation of the familjr units into
larger and larger kingship groupings. See David E. Apter, Ghana in
Transition (New York: Antheneum, 1963), p.80.
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R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution (Oxford University
Press, 1956), p.76. The author was a noted authority on Ashanti law,
religion and arts. The classification is based on his narration.
Feyiase is the name of a battle in which Ashanti gained its independence
from Denkyiraj also, the outcome of -Uie war was a turning point in Ashanti
history, in that the tenporary alliance of the independent divisions be¬
came a permanent political unit under the Asantehene.
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The pre-Feyiase period refers to the days of emerging political
structiire based on the family system aid the migration under its impetus.
The simple family unit was ruled by the house-father (abusua-panin).
This expanded into the larger territorial group, consisting of many
such units and comprising many clans (in theory, members of the same
clan are believed to be descendants of a remote common ancestress) and,
eventually, came under a single head. The commuimity was now a tid.be
under one chosen patriarch (odikro) and his sister or mother, i.e., under
a chief and Queen Mother and ruled by them. In this function, they were
assisted by the more important heads of the lesser groups who were at
first known as the Mpayinfo, i.e., the Elders. Many such communities
had grown up in widely separated areas. Each of these communities
lived in its own great settlement and was independent of all the rest
and subsisted by hunting and fishing in the forest surrounding its town¬
ship, which it came to consider as belonging to a tribe.. The custom
administered was still the custom of the individual family gz^ups; the
interference of the chief in internal family affairs was almost non¬
existent.
As the tribal settlements grew too large to contain and support
all the tribe, members of certain kindred broke away and wandered farther
afield in search of new hunting and farming grounds. This was the
history of settlements such as Kumasi, Juaben, Mampong, Kokofu, Nsuta
sund Bekwai.l
In each of the settlemaits a hierarchy of chiefs and their
councils developed, each possessing some well-defined powers over other
^E. A. Busia, The Position of the Qiief in the Modern Political
(London: Oxford University Press, 1951),, p.^S*
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lesser chiefs whose rank and aithority were similarly defined. The
lines of authority went through clan and lineage. Among the chiefs
and subdivisions! chiefs, lines were distinctly drawn to emphasize the
superordinate and subordinate roles of the respective chiefs.
At each level of the administrative hierarchy, from family to
division, every ruling unit consisted of a headman (odlkro), and the
lineage eldersj depending on the rank order of the unit, the latter
acted as a council. In both pre- and post-Feyiase periods, all matters
of public interest were dealt with by the chief in council. Any uni¬
lateral action was forbidden. Busia has pointed out that the early
morning council meetings had a dual purpose: to discuss matters of
general in^Dortance, such as the state of the roads, the food supply, or
to try ^judicial cases, and, also, for the elders to renew informally
their loyalties to chief, since frequent absenteeism was intezpreted
as disloyalty on the part of the elder
Busia continues his observations on the importance of the morning
council, thus:
If other meetings were necessary in addition to the morning
meetings to discuss matters of importance, the (diief sent
a messenger to call the elders, usually in the evenings, after
a day’s work had been done. The chief had to keep strictly
the injunction that he was to act only on the advise of his
elders. There were rare occasions, however, when in an
emergency he could act on his own initiative.2
The highest set of internal authorities was at the apex of the




with the paramount chief, formed a major part of the state council.
The state council and the state army performed the same functions
inasmuch as one could see the same kingship structural groups forming
the various divisions. Each section was under the leadership of an
elder. In peacetime, the chiefs and elders were responsible for the
administration of each state. They performed both religious and
Judicial functions — sacrifices to the gods and ancestral stools, and
maintenance of law and order in the community.
In the pre-Feyiase period, the Ashanti tribe consisted of a number
of ind^endent territorial divisions. These Ashanti divisions — Kumasi,
Mampon, Kumawu, Offinso, Juaben and Assumegya -- often aligned themselves
against other states. The Ashanti Union was formed when the Kumasi
Division attained supremacy over the other divisions. The paramount
chief of Kumasi (Kumasihene) became chief of Ashanti (Asantehene).
The particular circumstances surrounding the formation of the
Union reveaO. some of the myths and history found in Ghana. Perhaps
it would be worthwhile to recount these stories here since they are the
source of most of the norms and institutions of Ashanti customs idiich
have survived to this day.
The Ashanti Union, as has already been indicated, was founded as
a defensive measure against an invading state, Denkyira. The war, which
broke out in 1699, brought victory to the Ashanti at the battle of
Feyiase. The outcome of the battle was particularly significant since
it sparked a curious set of events. Initially, there was an alliance
between Osei Tutu (Kumasihene) and Okomfo Anokye, a fetish priest from
a different state in south Akwamu. Also, since the five most powerful
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chiefs of the Ashanti divisions were of the same clan and shared a common
language and other social obligations, where was some basis for unity.
In order to formalize their unity, Okomfo Anokye "made some medicine
and mixed it with palm wine and all the Ashanti chiefs drank itj under
his instructions, Osei Tutu made new swords for his army officers, each
swore to fight to the end."^
Shortly thereafter, in Kumasi at a meeting of all the Ashanti
division chiefs, Anokye brought down from the sky amidst thunder and a
thick cloud of white dust a wooden stool adorned with gold, which floated
to earth and alighted gently on the knees of Osei Tutu. "This stool,"
Anokye announced, "contained the spirit of the whole Ashanti nation, and
all its strength and bravery depended on the safety of the stool.
When the war with the Denkyira ended in victory for the Ashanti,
the Golden Stool weis enshrined as the most sacred object of the Ashantis.
All Ashanti chiefs owed their allegiance to it and, therefore, to the
Ashantehene.
This myth (the Golden Stool legend) granted Ashanti Confederation
an "aura of legitimacy." Having roots in an historical event such as
this, to deny it would be to deny the traditional religion as well.
This series of events, undoubtedly, laid the framework of national solid¬
arity.
With the est^lishment of the Ashanti Union, the divisional chiefs
maintained their independent status in most domestic matters, but cases
Iw. E. F. Ward, A Short History of Ghana (rev.ed.London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), p.UU.
2lbid., p.112.
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of military and certain judicial matters were designated to the Con¬
federacy. In military matters, the divisional chiefs formed part of
the Asantehene's armies and, in domestic matters, formed a part of the
Confederacy Council.
The Chiefs
The chief (ohene) is the suzerain lord over all the tribe. As
a custodian of the ancestral stools and as a head of the lineage, he
receives tributes and exercises certain ri^ts over them. On the
death of a chief, the members of his lineage meet under the supervision
of the Queen Mother and select a successor who must be approved by the
elders and community before he can be installed. The chief is not an
absolute monarch by any means. He is always controlled to a certain
extent by the elders. The chief cannot make treaties nor declare war
without the consent of his elders. Recalcitrant chiefs can be removed
from the "stool."
David Apter has categorized briefly the functions of chieftainship
as follows:
1. Sanctional source; This refers to the legitimacy stemming
from the chief, who, as a trustee for the ancestors, is a semi-
deified figure who represents prescribed norms of behavior.
2. Symbolic referent; The chief is the central orientational
symbol of tribal unity, continuity, and integration. l«/hen,
for exanople, the Asantehene was exiled, the Ashanti Confederacy
not only broke apart but was marked by widespread apathy.
3. Integrational integer; The chief serves as the chief
maker, not only exerting influence and control but also by
disolving conflict. His authority is taken as final.
U. Sub-ethnic or ethnic definition; The chief serves as the
historical membership totem representative in which the ties
of lineage, blood, clan — as expressed in social organization ~
have historical genealogical reference from the qualifications
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of the chief, and membership deriving thereto.^
The structural functions were ejqjressed by Apter as follows:
1. Military — expressed in a formal organization of power in
which lineage affiliation defined one's role and status.
2. Religious — expressed in the theocratic functions displayed
in almost every aspect of the chief's authority, whether in pouring
libation before an offering to the gods, or the death penalty for push¬
ing a chief or in the e^qpression of his decisions.
3. Legal ~ eapressed by maintaining his court for the adjudica¬
tion of disputes on formal grounds, at the same time being the advisor
and consultant on all aspects of human affairs.
U. Administrative ~ the expression of his authority as part
of a far-reaching network of communications, information orders, and
subordinate authority.
5* Trusteeship or custodianship — manifested in the chief's
responsibility over land use and land disposal as well as for the general
well-being of his people.^
These structures are shown in a number of social acts, for example,
sacrificing a sheep, sitting in court, or leading a military canpaign.
Since chieftainship developed out of the family system (matrilineal)
in which the father played both advisory and adjudicative roles, as the
number of social obligations under his jurisdiction increased, his judi-
^Apter, op.cit., pp.l0U-05. These functions as enumerated by
the author collaborate with the classifications of Busia and Rattray,
whose works are the most authoritative on the subject.
2lbid
18
cial responsibilities became more formalized. A series of "proverbs
norms” were both reliable sources of decision-making as well as public¬
ly recognized standards of behavior.
On various mornings, the chief would sit in court and hear all the
cases, together with his elders and the Queen Mother. Among cases
which came to the chief in council were destoolment cases, theft, viola¬
tion of the Great Oath (Ntamkesie), adultery, quarrels and divorces.
Seemingly, or to the casual observer, the chief was an autocrat;
however, as Rattray indicates more subtly:
In reality every move and command which appeared to emanate
from his mouth had been discussed in private and previously
been agreed upon by his councillors, to whom every one on
the tribe had access, and to whom popular opinion on any
subject was made known. Such at any rate was title ideal:
serious departure from the custom would eventually lead to
destoolment. Although nominally the Ashanti Constitution was
intended to appear to be autocratic, in correct practice was
democratic to a degree. The person of a chief was, moreover,
invested with sanctity Just so long as he sat upon the stoool
of his dead ancestors. This is the reason why there was
a reaction the moment a chief was destooledj when that happened,
insults, abuse, and even personal violence were used.l
The analysis, so far, has shown the importance of chieftainship
as a crucial political unit in the Akan political organization. It
is upon these sanctional sources, the symbolic referent and the "inte¬
gration integer" that Kkrumah attempted to develop hiSP authority as
Prime Minister or President of Ghana during the period of "institutional
transfer" and "political mobilization,"^ as will be discussed later.
Selection and Checks




which the candidate was selected by the Queen Mother (the sister or mother
of a chief), A new chief, generally, was selected from the royal clan.
In theory, there were several clans which could claim common ownership
of the stool, but it was the usual practice to confine the choice to
one particular clan. Exceptions were made where succession was trans¬
ferred from one kindred group to another, or where the chieftainship
might alternate or rotate among three or four kindred groups.
The lineage system was carefully followed;^ the eldest son of the
senior woman of the royal family might succeed or might not. Considera¬
tion could be given to brother, nephew, uncle, grandson, or grandfather.
At times, too, the heir-apparent could be the Abediakyiri, a member of
of the royal household, who had been marked out to succeed the reigning
chief on the death of the latter. In essence, the Abediakyiri acted
as regent during the chief's absence or his indisposition. In every
respect, it was the Queen Mother vho publicly nominated a successor to
the late chief, acting on the advice and consulting with the "tt^ayinfo"
(elders), who, in turn, took good care to find out the wishes of the
majority of the populace.
When a chief died and a new one was to be appointed, all the elders
attended a meeting under the chairmanship of the Krontihene (one of the
most senior chiefs in a division) and selected two representatives to
ask the Queen Mother for a nomination of a candidate for the vacant stool.
The Queen Mother, in turn, consulted with all the adult members of the
^Clan is composed of several lineages, the latter being local¬
ized and closely knit. It is considered taboo for clan members to
intermarry because of a basic belief in their common ancestry.
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royal lineage and, after considering all the eligible candidates, one
was selected on the basis of “intelligence, humility, generosity, manli¬
ness, and physical fitness.*^ Thereafter, the Krontihene was informed
of the choice and he, too, sent a message of “thanks* to the Queen
Mother, adding that a final decision would be forthcoming after a meet¬
ing with the Oman division. A day was then fixed for the meeting.
Soon after that, the Krontihene invited all the heads of the
village, through their various elders, for a general meeting. The sig¬
nificance of the meeting was judged by its group participation — all
the headmen, elders, and commers attending -the assembly.
If the commoners were dissatisfied with the choice, their spokesman
(Nkwankwaahene) would indicate to the elders as soon as the meeting start¬
ed. On the other hand, if the first candidate were unacceptable, on
consensus, the Queen Mother would be given an opportunity to make two
other nominations. If neither of these candidates was acceptable, the
divisional council would nominate a candidate from the royal family.
It was the Queen Mother’s prerogative to determine the eligibility of
such candidate. In case of further disagreement, the divisional councils'
candidate was given preference over the first three.^
After the election of the candidate, any previous conflicts between
the chief-elect and other members of the royal family or the community-
at-large, were adjusted. All the lineaige members swore an oath of al¬
legiance, indicating that “the precaution, besides expressing the solid¬




the oath of any member of the royal lineage who might have felt injured
at being passed over, to prevent him from working against the chief.
At the moment of enstoolment, the admonition of the public was
repeated to the chief. Busia indicates:
The okyeame (spokesman) addressed the chief-elect as
foUows.. .Konti, Akwamu, Bokoro, Asere, Kyidom, Behkum, Twafo,
Adonten, Nifa ~ all the elders say that I should give you
the stool. Do not go after women. Do not become a drunkard.
When we give you advice, listen to it. Do not gamble. We
do not want you to abuse us. We do not want you to be miserly;
we don't want one idio disregards advice; we do not want bullying;
we do not want beating. Take the stool. We bless the stool
and give it to you. The elders say they give the stool to
you.2
The chief was enstooled with words of caution ringing in his ears.
His election was a signal for rejoicing and sharing of group identity
and participation.
Particularly among the Akans, chiefs who went beyond the pre¬
scription of their office could be removed. In Ashanti and other Akan
groups, the general principle held that those who elected a chief had
the power to destool him. Some cases have indicated chiefs being de-
stooled for being overtly drunk or being gluttonous, dealing in charms
and magic, using abusive words, showing disrespect to elders or excessive
snobbery. In addition, chiefs had been removed for blindness, impotency,
insanity and disfigurement.
As has been indicated thus far, the Ashanti Confederacy was a
decentralized bureaucracy. The Asantehene had a large staff, assisted




and officials. An elaborate pattern of specific relationships
existed between the chief and his principal officers in which the various
performances were carefully worked out while their functions were not.
The efficiency of the system depended on the chief acting in con¬
cert with his elders on constitutional matters and the lineage system
which provided adequate representation to members of the tribe as well
as nonmembers. Destoolment served as a built-in mechanism to restrain
the chief from unconstitutional excesses. However, in later years,
such a delicate balance of power was to be upset by foreign rule. This
will be referred to later.
Nigeriat Ihe Yoruba Kingdom^
The indigenous political organization of the Yoruba kingdom
(Nigeria) was similar to that of the Akans of Ghana which has already
been disciossed in this chapter. A slight difference is to be found in
that aspect of chieftainship in which the Yoruba is hereditary-oriented.
The Yoruba politicaQ. organization prior to colonial rule may be summar¬
ized as follows:
The Yorubas were united and ruled by one kingdom from the old
Oyo Empire. By 1780, the kingdom had split into four states: Oyo,
Egba, Kebi, and Jebu. Similar to the Akans of Ghana, the Yorubas con¬
sisted of several lineages and clans around idiich the social economic
units of the tribe revolved.
^The Yoruba "kingdom" lies between Lagon in the south, the
Niger in the north, and between the Dahomey frontier to the west and
Benin country to the east. See Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1963), pp.29-36.
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There were two heads of the tribe: Oni of Ife, the religious
head of the tribe and custodian of the holy city and relics therein,
while the Alafin of Qyo was the political head responsible for admini¬
stration and general military duties.
;Chieftaincy was a crucial unit in the traditionaQ. political
organization. The Yoruba chief (oba), similar to his Akan counterpart,
was a sacred king. As a direct descendant of the original founder of
the town and also as one of the sons of Oduduwa, the progenitor of
Yoruba people, the oba enjoyed the loyalty of, as well as received tri¬
butes from, his people. Chieftaincy among the Yorubas was hereditary
and the selection system lay within the lineage. Upon the death of
oba, members of his lineage met and selected a successor who had to be
approved by the elders of the royal lineage after the lineage had con¬
sulted the Ifa oracle to ascertain the duration and prosperity of the
candidate's reign.
Though nominally subject to the Alafin of Oyo, each clan had been
virtually independent for some time, the government being in the hands
of kings who, although theoretically absolute, were, in practice, con¬
trolled by the comcil of elders idiich had always existed in every
state. The council possessed enough powers to choose a new king.
The choice, however, was limited to the royal lineage. The council
deliberated with the king on matters of war and peace and other general
matters. Unusual matters were discussed by the convocation of the
entire community.
The system of religion was ancestor-worship. In addition, there
were different gods responsible for the general welfare of the community.
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For instance, there were gods of thunder, smallpox, fertility and
harvesting. Hence, worshipping was communal and mandatory. The
state was responsible for the carrying out of religious obligations.
One can see the unbreakable link between religion and politics.
From the above, it can be inferred that the Yoruba society was
highly integrated. Similar to the Akan system of Ghana, there were
certain integrative influences — belief in common origin, tribal poli¬
tical unity, inter-tribal marriage, and the possession of Yoruba deities
— which held the society together.
The foregoing survey of the two major groups of Ghana and Nigeria
has referred mainly to the scale of political organization achieved by
each group in the pre-colonial days.
Throughout Ghana and Nigeria, the fundamental kingship unit was
the lineage ~ Ashanti, abusua; Yonaba, idile. It had conmianded the
strongest loyalty because it was the primary social and economic unit.
Kingship government, at the lineage level and below it, was
basically the same. It was at the higher levels of traditional poli¬
tical structures 'Uiat wide sanctions were to be noted. Among the
Yoruba, the chiefs (obas) of the subtribes were either hereditary or
were elected fromg among a limited royal family who rviled in turn.
Among the Akans, the system was matrilineal ~ brothers, nephews (sisters'
children), or grandfathers. The entire Yoruba and Akan systems were
marked by checks and balances and the superstructure was essentially
that of a constitutional monarchy. In general, government was the
business of liie whole community, and, accordingly, was democratic.
CHAPTER III
THE COLOMIAL LEGACY
This chapter outlines and evaluates the impact of colonial
administration on the indigenous political systems. The relevance
of this lies in the fact that it will be possible to indicate the level
of integration Ghana and Nigeria attained under colonial rule.
Indirect Rvile
For the most part, after the initial declaration of colony and
protectorate status for the various parts of the Gold Coastl and Nigeria,
a network of district commissioners was provided. The district com¬
missioners were directly responsible to the governor, while the former
ruled through indigenous tribal groupings. Significantly, it is from
the superimposition of British authority, represented by the district
^It is significant to mention that earlier consolidation of
British power in the Gold Coast, hereinafter referred to as Ghana,
proceeded in two steps. First, the coastal area was made a Crown
Colony in l87li. Then, Ashanti was declared a conquered colony and
the Northern Territories were made a protectorate in 1901. The Ashanti
province and the Northern Territories were directly under the governor
and his delegated officer-chief commissioner. It was not until 19U6
that the Ashanti province was incorporated into the colony's Legisla¬
tive Council. See Apter, op.cit., p.ll9.
Western and Northern Nigeria became British protectorates in
1901 and 1900 respectively. In 19lU, the protectorates of North and
South were amalgamated and became the Crown Colony of Nigeria. See
James S. Coleman, Nigeria; Background to Nationalism (Los Angeles; Uni¬
versity of California Press, 1956), p.lh*
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commissioners, over the traditional system, represented by the chiefs,
that an increasingly unstable political situation arose. This situa¬
tion was finally expressed in nationalism after World War II.
An interesting paradox of British administration was that while
the system of indirect rule was geared toward integrating the tribal
systems into the codes and rules of British behavior, the system broke
down with the identification of the chiefs with British authority.
Apter explains this contradiction by pointing out the fact that the codes
and rules which the British had intended to introduce were not adopted,
partly because the people did not understand the codes and rules and
partly because the people did not have the opportunity to act and be
received as British officials.
The term "indirect rule" is associated with Sir Frederick Lugaixi,
who devised the system for ruling the newly-conquered Moslem Emirs in
Northern Nigeria while having only a small force of officers.^ The
Emirates were preserved as administrative units and the Emirs maintained
the traditional leadership capacities. It was intended that, except
for the extreme practices contrary to the so-called British standards
of morality, traditional social life should continue unimpaired.
The system, as Lugard defined it, had an essential feature in
which the traditional rulers constituted an integral part of the machinery
of administration. He observed:
There are not two sets of rulers -- British and natives —
working either separately or in cooperation, but a single govem-
^Roland Oliver and F. A. Fage, A Short History of West Africa (New
York: New York University Press, 1962), p.l70. See also George Padmore,
How British Rule Africa (London: Wisharts Books, Ltd., 1936), pp.238-39.
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ment in which the native chiefs have well defined duties
and an acknowledged status equally with British officials.
Iheir duties never conflict and should overlap as little as
possible. They must be complementary to each other and the
chief himself must understand that he has no idght and power
unless he renders his proper services to the state.^
Indirect rule shifted the focus of traditional authority to
British law. To retain the organizational structure of traditional
social life without in^jairing its efficiency, attacks against traditional
authorities were made synonymous with a breach of the British law. The
\inderlying principles of Indirect rule, as expounded by Lugard, are
briefly enumerated here:
1. Native rulers could not raise or control armed forces.
2. The right to impose taxation was reserved to the colonial
government.
3. The colonial government was the source of all legislation.
U. The governer had the exclusive right of confirming the
enstoolment or destoolment of a diief.2
From the above principles, it is unmistakably clear that the con¬
cept of indirect rule was based upon a system in which colonial govern¬
ment functioned through the principal chiefs as agents, with residual
and plenary powers reserved for the colonial authorities.
The Effects of Indirect Rule
One of the effects of indirect rule was to shift the focus of
authority and responsibility away from the legitimate properties of
chieftaincy to those of British power. An immediate consequence was
to identify the chiefs as agents of British rule. Accordingly, in 192 U,
the Native Authorities Ordinance, which defined the powers and duties.
^Apter, op.cit., p.l20.
^Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa
(London and Edimburgh: Nelson, 1922), p.l?!:.
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was passed. Busia explains:
Government not only appoints a Native Authority, but also
prescribes its powers and duties. These may be divided into
two broad categories: administrative and judicial. The duty
of a Native Authority is to maintain order and good government
in the area over which its authority extends. For this purpose
the Ordinance gives it certain defined powers: it may interpose
to prevent the commission of any crime within the area of its
authorityj it has power to direct any native to attend before
itself or any Government officerj it may issue orders to be
obeyed by such natives within its area as may be subject to its
jurisdiction for certain purposes set out in the Ordinance and
generally for the improvement of sanitation and for the better
preservation of health. Subject to the approval of the governor
it makes rules providing for the peace, good order, and welfare
of the native within the area its authority.^
In essence, the residual authority of the Crown was the actual
destructive factor in indirect rule. Chiefs whose powers were tradi¬
tionally kept in balance by a continuous interaction of lineage, king-
ship, and clan integrity, suddenly became figures whose ultimate legi¬
timacy was derived from British law. A chief could be recognized as
chief only when gazetted by the governor. The most disruptive element
of all was introduced by altering the traditional legitimacy into a
2
legitimacy derived from Pax Britannica.
In actual fact, the classic e^jplication of indirect rule of the
type developed by Lugard in Northern Nigeria was never applied in Ghana.
The British were equally concerned with presejrving the status and
dignity of traditional authorities, but an indirect rule was virtually
impossible, except in the Muslim state of the North, for a basic premise
of the system rested on the assumption that the chiefs were the appointees




scarcely possible, for tiie chief, to be accepted as "traditional,"
needed to be selected by the proper constitutional procedures — and
the candidate thus selected might not necessarily be sound from the
British point of view. By tradition, recalcitrant chiefs were de-
stooled
According to Apter, the impact of indirect rule on the tradi¬
tional political system could be described in two ways: (role differ-^
2
entiation and (2) solidarity.
Previously, the general criteria of traditional roles which were
based on lineage membership or sex, suddenly gave way to new values.
Role differentiation was considered on the basts of one's ejqperience,
training and ability. For example, the slave's son who went to mission
school and had attained some measure of education would be eligible for
junior posts in the colonial civil service. The rise in their politi¬
cal influence ~ some of them becoming nationalist at the turn of the
centtiry -- was a potential source of friction which undermined stability
within the traditional framework.
Differentiation on the basis of religion was undermined by
Christianity. The new religion, with its greater number of adherents,
drastically reduced the effectiveness of the chief's sanctional control.
^In Western Nigeria, the Oba (king) is appointed from the royal
lineage as in the Akan states. Eastern Nigeria could be described
as egalitarian with no system of chieftaincyj the community was ruled
by elders, who were appointed solely on merits and achievements within
the community. To counteract this practice, the district commissioners




Busia illustrates this with a story of a native convert idio, on being
asked why he failed to observe the traditional holiday of obligation,
Asase Yaa Da (sacred Thursday), retorted: "The priest says we must not
do this; it is against the laws of the church."^ This was the nature
of the conflict between old standards and new values.
Differentiation on the basis of age was undermined in the general
rejection of the old life by the young.^ Such repudiation varied in
extremes from rural to urban areas. For instance, under the tradition¬
al patteiti of authority when a conflict developed between a young man
and an elder it was difficult for the young man to protest. Such a
protest was almost an admission of guilt and demanded an apology. A
case in point is demonstrated in a confrontation between the Asantehene
and Krobe Edusei during the Boycott Crisis of 191:8:
Asantahene; during the recent unrest in Ashanti we (chiefs)
maintained silence, and watched you with a philanthropic
contempt. We were convinced, and we were not wrong ~ that
you would reach nowhere. Here you stand belittled, accused
of a heinous crime, a crime compatible if not synonymous
with theft... .Tell me what power you beat gong-gong and your
law?
Krobo Edusei: I have no power to do what I did, hence I have
made overtures to Nana Ofinsohene to plead with you for pardon
for me.3
Role differentiation under indirect rule brought about a new social
stratification based on economic class and social status. Previously,
the traditional clusters of roles in the Oman (state), contingent on the
^Busia, op.cit., p.l37«
2For a fiu*ther delineation on this conflict in the post-independence
period, see David E. Apter, The Political Kingdoms in Uganda (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 196l), Hp.88-89.
^Dennis Avis tin. Politics in Ghana: 19U6-1960 (London: Oxford
University Press, I96I;), p. 79.
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clan, the chiefs, and sub-chiefs with lineage and other traditional
status, were eroded by a new social class. This trend has been a
continuous source of tension to the present day.
Indirect rule, as it particularly reinforced the authority of
the chief (the Gazette method, it should be recalled, had authorized
the governor to confirm or rejett the installation of a new chief) to
go beyond traditions, weakened the potency of the political foundations
which had seized as restraints on chieftaincy. As it strengthened
the chief's authority, indirect rule allowed him to go against tradi¬
tional boundaries and break the effectiveness of traditional checks.
>S.ht this new power, the chief was able to sponsor his children and some
relatives to the mission schools. Generally, the products of such
schools tended to bind themselves together into "solidarity groups," such
as Boy Scouts, Progressive Union, and various literary societies which
worked for the improvement of their societies or became the centers of
the nationalist movement.
As a result of the solidarity group idiich emerged, traditional
kinship affiliation took on two aspects: brothers or relatives could
work together in the same affiliatory agency — a reliable source of
organizational nucleus in the nationalist movementj however, the existence
of such groups was regarded by the chiefs as a threat to their authority.
The discussion of the system of indirect rule has revealed a
significant disintegrative influence on the traditional political system.
The concept of British colonial administration represented by a colonial
government was based on foreign norms from idiich the native administra¬
tion derived its legitimacy. Thus, traditional authority, which had
32
served as a nucleus in the integrated political life of the tribe was
weakened. Other influences of colonial rule have been appraised in
a subsequent presentation; meanwhile, a background discussion of certain
social and economic factors would be helpful.
Social and Economic Integration
The overriding consideration of British activity in the nine¬
teenth century was to transform the African societies of Ghana and
Nigeria into free trading communities producing tropical raw materials
and consuming British manufactured goods. British rule had been estab-
•4
lished to protect these economic interests. The new British colonies
thus began with an early developed trading basis. At first, British
administration had little in the way of a positive policy of economic
development.^
The nineteenth century British liberal economic theory rejected
the idea that the state had any role in organizing or in accumulating
any investing capital except in infra-structures — roads, harbors —
and in colonial affairs, it was axiomatic that a colony must develop from
its own resources without subsidies from the metropolitan power. What
the state refused, private British capitalists were no more willing to
provide. The British economic interests in West Africa were dominate
by traders and shippers vho were already making steady profits by
simply transporting and making African produce, and they showed no in¬
clination to take risks by investing capital in new methods of produc¬
tion or in industrial development with the sole exception of mining.
^Flint, op.cit., p.lUl.
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Despite this lack of any planned or purposeful action for
economic development, the effects of the establishment of British rule
upon the economies of Nigeria and Ghana were profound* The destruction
of the independence of the African states idiich comprised the new colonies
created free markets of a size hitherto unprecedented* Internal tolls
on the movement of goods disappeared, and movement of persons became
easy and safe* The suppresion of internal slave trading and raiding
forced the profit motive to concentrate on productive occupations, and
the spread of a uniform tax created a security of persons and property
which intensified the accumulation of goods, savings and cspital*
Moreover, British administration itself had direct economic
effects. The number of white officials grew steadily after the intro¬
duction of an anti-malaria control system in 1897• The employment of
African clerks also increased and Africans earned wages in the police
and army on an increasing scale* These activities, centered around the
administrative stations, attracted unofficial wage earners such as
gardeners, tailors, launderers, and the like. Much larger groups con¬
gregated in the colonial or regional capitals such as Lagos, Accra,
Kumasi and Cape Coast, where the needs of the administration developed*^
Most skilled crafts, such as printing, driving, carpentry, mechanical
repair and service employments, had already been established by the
missions*^ In all these centers where steadily growing groups of
^The development of the regional capitals — urbanization was
precipitated by iiunigrants from other areas, e*g*. Northern Ghana, who
had come to work in the mines, cocoa farms, or to sell cattle*
2Busia, op.cit*, p*12li*
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wage earners developed, the retail trade expanded; neaity farmers
or wage earners began to bring foodstuffs to the market; rents began
to be charged; and barter disappeared to be replaced with currency
transactions.
The administration centers (which, of course, were often in
traditional urban centers) naturally became functions in the network
of roads, for the administrators built roads as much for their own con¬
venience and for rapid movement of police and troops as for commercial
use. Many of the early British officers were fanatic road builders,
for without development funds, and practically without revenues in the
early days, road construction was among the few tangible things they could
achieve. In traditional society, able-bodied males had the obligation
to maintain roads,^ and the British officials could call on this source
of manpower to build unsurfaced laterite roads and sinqple culverts
using nearby materials. In this way, the administrative centers tended
to become collecting centers for local produce where the African middle¬
man brought goods for sale to European buyers and took away imported goods
for distribution.^ The towns also tended to attract the mission schools,
especially those liiich tried to conduct higher education in Eiiglish to
senior pupils and which needed to draw on a wide source of information.
The towns thus came to be centers of economic opportunity, of
political influence and of education, and they naturally attracted
ambitious Africans, especially able men who had little status according




Id cash relationships and were stimulated to new wants. In the towns
there was an admixture of ti*ibeS} custom was watered down, and these
new wants and attitudes filtered back from the towns to the more con¬
servative rural areas.^
Thus, 'tiie in^osition of British rule and the growth of cash-
oriented African minorities were sufficient to produce a steady rise in
the trade of Ghana. The rise in trade meant increasing yields from
custom duties and, by the early l890's, the colonial governor was consider¬
ing investing surpluses to produce further economic advance. It was
not difficult to conclude that the chief impediment to further development
was the lack of an effective transportation system. Only on the Niger,
in the Oil Rivers area, and to a lesser extent on the Volta Kivers was
the shipment of goods relatively simple, with the steamers fed by a net¬
work of canoe transport. Once away from liver access, transport over
long distances by human portage became prohibitively expensive, and this
cost increased with the gradual eradication of slavery. Moreover, it
was known that mineral deposit existed — gold in Ghana, tin in Northern
Nigeria — but extensive deep mining operations were impossible when the
necessEiry heavy machinery could not be placed on the spot. Railways
2
were the obvious answer.
In the l880's, various private British syndicates had asked for
concessions to develop railway systems in Ghana and from Lagos to Yoruba-
^For an interesting discussion of the development of the new towns
in Tropical Africa, see Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa
(New York: New York University Press, 1957)> pp.63-69.
^Flint, op.cit., p.lit2.
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land (Western Nigeria), but all required some kind of British guarantee
of interest on their capital. In 1885, the Colonial Office announced
that if it were satisfied that a railwa7 would be profitable, then the
colonial government itself would construct and operate the lines. The
government firmly held to this policy in subsequent years and the rail¬
ways thus became state enterprise when they were constructed. After
1891, the serious work of surveying prospective lines in (Bxana and from
Lagos started. In I896, construction began on a Lagos line which
reached Ibadan in 1900 and this slowly crept up into Northern Nigeria
where the northern governor had created a separate system ihich was
joined to the Lagos line in 1911. Construction of a railway system for
Eastern Nigeria did not begin until 1913 when the line was begun to
Enugu, the new regional capital which was reached in 1916, and between
1919 and 1931, the eastern line was extended across the Benue River to
join the northern system.^ Ghana lines were then linked by the H\ini
Valley line which was finished in 1927. The forest along Ghana was
thus more intensively covered by rail than any other area of Tropical
Africa.
The railways had dramatic results on the mining activities. In
1905., Ghana exported only $66,000 worth of gold; by 1903, when the rails
reached Kumasi, this had risen to $765,000. By 1907, gold exports were
worth over $1,000,000 and, by 1913, over $U,500,000. Ancillary mining
also developed on a lesser scale for diamonds and manganese. In
Nigeria, the tin mining showed the same development, and the value of




The mining conqpsuiies were entirely European ovmed, for only
Europeans were able to acquire sufficient capital to purchase expensive
mining machinery and isolated efforts by educated Africans failed.
European coital also secured control of banking with the establish¬
ment in the l890*s of the Bank of British West Africa controlled by A.
L. Jones, the shipping magnate of Liverpool, who controlled the Elder
Dempster's shipping lines to West African colonies and who soon obtained
the privilege of currency issue «id acted as banker to the colonial
governments. In its credit operations it adopted normal conservative
British standards of security for leans so that it was of little value
2
to Africans in extending their range of economic investment. lifliole-
sale trade and the bulk import-export trade also fell under virtually
conplete non-African control, in this field, during the nineteenth
century, a group of West African merchants tried to ship direct to
England, but their efforts were none too successful. At the end of
the nineteenth century, there were already signs of increasing mono¬
polistic tendencies among the European traders exemplified by the Royal
Niger Company. After 1885, there were negotiations:for amalgamation of
the Niger Company with all the traders of Liverpool and Glasgow, but
these fell through as a result of the liquidation of one of the African
traders. The Liverpool traders came together, however, as the African
Association Limited and, in 1892, the Association and the Niger Company
^Ibid., p.lUU.
2Such practices have been continxxed even to the present dayi This
explains irtiy local entrepreneurs in both Ghana aid Nigeria have not been
able to conpete successfully with the foreign firms (see Chapter IV).
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began interlocking directors on each other's boards. The real pressure
toward monopoly, however, came with the rise of the great firm of Lever
Brothers, which later bought out the Niger Con5)any and united with
other firms to become the United African Company, The new company was
granted the right of wholesaling and import-ejqport trade to and from
West Africa. Lever Brothers attempted to get into the palm oil
plantations in Nigeria, but such an attempt was frustrated by the
British officials who feared a long-run repercussion from the natives.
In any event, African production of palm oil rose from $li, 250,000 in
1900 to $1U,500,000 in 191ii. Palm kernels increasingly became an
*
ingredient in the manxifacture of margarine. The sale of the kernels
rose from $2,250,000 in 191ii to over $7,500,000 in 1918.^
In Ghana, an attempt to introduce ihe sale of palm products and
rubber was short-lived. The colonial administration did nothing to help
to alter the basic pattern of subsistence farming. The heavy reliance
placed on the cultivation of a single crop led to the neglect of local
food crops and diversity of cash crops, and even the encouragement of
2
single-crop crop cultivation was not accompanied by stable prices.
The British hoped that cotton would become such a cash crop
grown by Africans, and efforts were made to promote its growth in
Yorubaland and adjacent to the railway line with some success. The
linking of Lagos and Kano by rail after 1911, gave the Northern Nigeria




developed until it was worth $527,000 in 19lU. By 1950, the ground¬
nut industry was one of Northern Nigeria's most significant sources of
income* But the most spectacular development of cash agriculture —
the development of cocoa farming ~ was unforeseen by the British and
came as a result of spontaneous African movement.
The Basel missionaries in Ghana had tried to introduce cocoa
cultivation in 1958 but had failed. In 1879> a Ghanaian, Tete Quarshie,
brought cocoa flrpm Fernando Po, a Portuguese island in the Gulf of
Guinea. By 1859^ Ghanaian farmers exported thirteen tons, and by 1905
exports had leaped to 5>000 tonsj thereafter, the figures doubled and
redoubled until, in 1911, Ghana became the world's leading producer,
exporting U0,000 tons of cocoa worth $ii,500,000. Cocoa now outstripped
gold as the country's chief industiy and the value continued to rise in
subsequent years.^
The Legacy
From the preceding discussion, one can detect some of the
socioeconomic forces which laid the framework of future political inte¬
gration in Ghana and Nigeria, although social change and disiniption
of political integration are perhaps more significant. Social change
was brought about through education, market economy, and Christianity,
thereby precipitating political disintegration. In the broadest
sense, such a paradox is termed colonial legacy.
Increasing numbers of educated people were perceived as threats
to the authority of traditional elites. Literary and cultural groups,
such as the Ibo State Union, the Kotoko Societies, and the Oduduwa
^Flint, op.cit., p.lii7«
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were considered to be usurping more political power than was permitted
under traditional political organization. In the long run, events
proved that such suspicion was not misdirected.
Christianity more than any other phenomenon profoundly affected
social change. Drastic changes were noted in the animistic religion
of the Toruba and in the ancestral worship of the Akans respectively.
Since religion is perceived as promoting unity between the living and
the dead, the demarcation between politics and religion was barely
distinguishable•
Although Christianity and missionary education were closely
related, the principles of indirect rule excluded the influence of
Christian missionaries on education but did affect differences in the
social economic progress of Southern and Northern Nigeria.
In the final analysis, the impact of colonial rule on the tradi¬
tional societies of Ghana and Nigeria had the following results: the
older individual societies were replaced by a newer plviralistic society
superimposed by a new culture ~ Christianity, Western education,
market economy and urbanization. This is the "colonial legacy." In
essence, colonial legacy can be described safely as the matrix of the
national integration in Ghana and Nigeria.
CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL PARTIES
In the preceding chapters, some aspects of traditional political
organization of the Akan and Toruba societies have been evaluated by
noting, especially, the integrative influences which existed in these
societies during the precolonial days. Also the impact of colonial
rule on the traditional political organization has been assessed and
the attempt of the colonial administration to coalesce the plural
societies into nation states — Ghana and Nigeria — has been noted.
However, the post-independence period has given rise to a strong pull
of centrifugal forces which have repeatedly threatened the popular
social and political institutions which unite these countries. In
the light of this, the degree to ^Aiich national integration has been
the function of the political parties in Ghana and Nigeria will be
assessed and appraised. To accomplish these objectives, firstly, an
assessment will be made of the party system to find out whether there
is any correlation between the grcwth of the parties and the rebuilding
of the two countries involved. (Specifically, the study will confine
itself to the period between 1952 and the beginning of 1966.) Also,
certain indicators will be employed to help evaluate the rate at which
each political party has either promoted or inhibited national inte¬
gration.
k2
For analytical purposes, this presentation will be prefaced
with a brief comment on the kind of party systems involved in political
integration in the developing countries. Apter in his model for
political process on developing countries has classified the party
systems involved in this process into three categories: mobilization,
consociational and modernizing autocracy.l For the purposes of this
study, the first two only will be discussed.
The Mobilization System
This may be described briefly as a kind of political system
mobilizing the entire society for internal development. One of the
means of achieving this is the use of "organizational weapons," defined
as unrestrained constitutional excesses, such as restraining and co¬
ercing opposition as well as enforcing strict discipline on the rank and
file cf party membership. The method involves recreating a structural
basis for the society, i.e., creating new values. Here, the need for
seeking rapid economic changes and creating the party's ideal society
is so urgent that loyalty and dedication to the party goals are imperative
from all and sundry. Some countries, whose political systems correspond
to this model are Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Algeria. These countries
have dominant one-party states.
The Federal Consociational System
Under this system, the parties do not lose their identity -(dien
merged in some form of union. The groups have flexible internal policies
ISome thoughts on this discussion have been borrowed from David E.
Apter, Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp.23“2U.
because they do not demand total commitment to their ideals and pro¬
grams. Thus, crises and fissions are regarded as natural concomitants.
The party systems of the first federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco
and Senegel tend to follow the consociational system. It is significant
to note that the party system in Nigeria deviates somewhat from this
system} however, it is being employed for analytical purposes only.
Firstly, the federal government was a coalition of two major parties;
and secondly, each of the three major political parties was well en¬
trenched in its own region. This model is being applied in a limited
sense only. On the other hand, the comparative nature of the parties
under federal level, seemingly fits the model for cur purpose.
Having now borrowed a model, an explanation of the political
systems of Ghana and Nigeria will follow, in order to detect how the
model sheds light on the understanding of the party systems of the
countries.
The Ghanaian Party System
Post-World War II nationalistic sentiment in Ghana was politicized
in a national movement, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). This
movement, founded by Dr. J. B. Danquah and a group of lawyers and
businessmen in 19li7, had as its secretary Kwame Nkrumah, irtio became
President of Ghana in I960, and served until 1966. The objective of
UGCC was to “ensiire that the direction and control of government in
the Gold Coast (Ghana) shall pass into the hands of the people and their
chiefs in the shortest possible time.**^ The UGCC was a coalition of
^Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., p.271.
the middle class and intelligentsia and since the organization did
not transcend the boundaries of the southern regional cities, the
movement lacked the momentum and force as an effective nationalistic
movement. At that time what was needed to bring the people together
was an all-embracing political movement containing within itself the
vision of a new society. This was the circumstance that psroduced the
Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in 19h9.
Within a short time of its inception, the CPP founded and led
by Kwame Nkrumah had evened chapters throughout the length and breadth
of the country. With its populist appeal, the party attracted all
segments of the people in the land: the partially educated, the masses,
the dissident elements who resented the influences of the traditional
leaders, a small but artic\ilate number of journalists, the ex-service-
men, industrial workers, and the immigrants from the rural areas.^
As a political movement, the CPP appealed to the whole society
in the name of the leader and independence. The party adopted social¬
ism (and Nkrumahism) as its ideology. This was designed to secure
state control of the economy, planned economic growth, egalitarian
social policies, aid the destruction of the influences and privileges
of previous elite groups. Through the diligent efforts of the party
leaders and by the tedinique of mass organization, llie party succeeded
p
until the military coup of 1966.
^Ibid.
p^This may sound controversial. The cause of the coup is not a
reflection of ethnic or sectional rivalry, as was the case in Nigeria.
The motivating factors would be attributable to popular resentment
against too hi^-handed monetary and fiscal policies as well as a tendency
The first general elections in the country, held in 195l>
pressed upon the country that the CPP was a force to reckon with.
In the 19$h elections, the first popular election the British allowed
in the country, the opposition — consisting mostly of the erstwhile
and fragmented UGCG ~ was relatively strong and won 32U,822 of the
popular votes, as against CPP*s 391*720. This is only 20 percent more
than the opposition vote. Due to poor parliamentary showing and
mostly due to organizational weakness, liie opposition began to dis¬
integrate after 195U. The disintegration of the opposition was per¬
ceived by the minorities as an end to any effective impact on the
national political scene. This, in turn, stimulated political organi¬
zations along ethno-sectional lines. Thus, the National Liberation
Movements (NIM), the Muslim Association Party (MAP), the Northern
Peoples Party (NPP) were products of sectional partyism. However, in
the midst of this ethnic nationalism, the CPP received 398,li»l votes
in the 1956 general elections, while the comjained opposition votes were
299*166. The party had a great loss of votes principally in Ashanti
and Northern Ghana idiere ethnic nationalism was vocal. The post-in¬
dependence election of I960 tells another story, which cannot be ex¬
plained adequately in this paper. Ghana became officially a one-party
state. The results of the Republic elections are self-esqplanatory:
CPP l,000*7U0j Opposition 12U,623(see Table 1).
The party began to consolidate its position shortly thereafter
toward one-man rule. For a detailed discussion see Bob Fitch and







Source: Computed from Austin, op«cit., pp» 350» 39Ui Uli4-«
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into a one-party state, as well as embarking upon coirqprehenslve and
gigantic programs to rebuild the country* Concurrently, the political
consolidation of CPP was matched with social and economic programs to
transfom the country. Since the political transformation of CPP
into a one-party system has been invariably linked with the social-
economic development of Ghana, it would be helpful to examine this
relationship fuz^her.
The process of consolidation into a dominant one-party state
involved four types of activityj one was the elimination and neutraliza¬
tion of political opposition. Another entailed tan^tering with elections
and Introducing certain constitutional innovations, such as the Preventive
Detention Act or the Avoidance of Discrimination Act.^ The third was
structural unity: nationalizing non-party groups, such as the trade
unions, farmers' groups, and voluntary associations, the strengthening
of the regional branches, and constituency organizations, and the purging
of dissident elements from the party. ^ The fourth was by means of
ideological rationalization, theories affirming the virtues of one¬
's
party systems.*'
In the coTU'se of strengthening one-party rule in Ghana, the CPP,
in a similar vein, embarked on a series of seven-year national develop¬
ment plans geared toward economic modernization.^
^or a detailed and authoritative account of this, see Burnett
Harvey, Law and Social Change in Ghana (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1956).
^Apter, Ghana in Transition, pp.3U3-U6.
^S. E. Finer, "One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsideration,"
Government and Opposition. XI, No.U (July-October, 1967).
^Some aspects of this are discussed in the following chapter.
A key elen»nt in the theory of the mobilization party system,
judging from the foregoing, is that the staggering problem of nation¬
building and economic modernization require a central and unitary organi¬
zation within the state. The one-party system, therefore, is the ideal
organization.
In summary, the Ghanaian political scene in tiie post-independence
period was dominated by multi-party systems, all competing for in¬
fluence. However, it was not until after I960 that the Convention
Peoples Party, through the combination of certain factors (the situa¬
tional factor and the political culture of the party leaders) that
Ghana became a one-party state. In the light of this, an assessment
will be made of some sfpecific aspects of the foregoing historical poli¬
tical developments which have affected the pace and level of national
integration.
Indicators of National Integration
In the introductory chapter, different concepts of national inte¬
gration were presented. For the purpose of this study, Coleman and
Hoseberg’s definition has been chosen. As was pointed out, Coleman
and Roseberg perceived national integration as subsuming dual problems:
integrating along ethnic and regional lines, i.e., territorial integra¬
tion, and illuminating the demarcation between the better, more cultured
segments of the society and the ordinary people (political integration).
Purposely, the objective of the nation-builders is toward a much more
homogeneous political community.
As the indicators suggest, the CPP as a national party was able to
reduce regional antagonism and parochialism by adopting both legal and
extra-constitutional measures.^ Specifically, in the immediate post¬
independence period, faced with separatist threats from the Ashanti
and Volta (Ewes) regions, the govemment did not hesitate to pass the
necessary legislation to meet the situation.
It has already been indicated that the chief is a personifica¬
tion of the Akan society. The existence of different historic groups,
each with a chief, brought about different allegiances and divided
loyalties. In the course of reducing tensions and coalescing the
multiplicity of regional loyalties, the residual power of traditional
rulers, if obstructive and divisive or supportive, was coopted and inte¬
grated or neutralized, as was seen after 1959. The short-run political
stability after that period was testimony of the party's relative success
in effecting societal restratification.
Some of the rank and file membership of the CFP which had resent¬
ed the authority of the traditional rulers found in the party and the
leader a rallying point for unity. The introduction of symbolic arts,
such as pressing Nkrumah's profile on stamps and coins was meant to
impress the party's authority and, more particularly, to fill the vacuum"
of leadership which the alienated groups had missed under the tradition¬
al system. In short, the charismatic aixi symbolic acts of the party
were meant to displace and replace the much older pattern of tradition-
^Particularly referred to is the Avoidance of Discriminatory
Act and the Local Government Ordinance of 1961, which respectfully out¬
lawed parties' or groups' affiliation based upon ethnic, religious,
racial or sectional lines and appreciably reduced the powers of tradi¬
tional authority. For more details, see Harvey, op.cit.
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al authority.
The annexation of non-party groups to the CPP was one of the means
of effecting horizontal integration. The Trade Union Council, the
Farmers Union and most of the voluntary associations were the outcome
of both colonial and traditional influences.^ The bringing together
of these diverse groups under one leadership encouraged mass participa¬
tion and social mobility which transcended clan, regional or ethnic
considerations. The emergence of national consciousness was the out¬
come of such interaction.
Another indicator of political integration is the composition
of party membership, or how the party recruits its membership along
regional and ethnic lines. The reorganization of the CPP in regional
and district constituencies after 1955 was an important factor in
promoting inter-ethnic solidailty. The country was divided into 102*
constituencies for the 1956 general elections. The CPP was the only
party among myriads of parties to put up a candidate for each of the
constituencies. The perception of the masses to the party and its
goals, as reflected in four general elections is presented in Table 1
(the data in this table is interpreted elsewhere in this chapter).
Closely allied with building territorial integration is the
elimination of the mass-elite bifurcation, or What Coleman and Roseberg
call effecting political integration. In essence, the cardinal point
in political integration is economic modernization. Ihe point here
is that massive social-economic development programs can be extremely
^Hodgkin, op.cit., p.77.
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valuable in closing the gap between the elites and masses and progres¬
sively reducing the potential for regional separatism.^ Thus the GPP,
after 19b0, intensified its determined efforts to effect social and
economic modernization.
To be sure, the results of the government's heavy outlay in
economic modernization could be seen from selected indicators of pro«
gress between 1951 and 1961: the number of rural and urban clinics
rose from one to 30; transportation and coimnunication increased from
1>398 to 2,050, showing a rise of h6»7 percent; in public utilities,
the number of rural water supplies increased from 3>327 to it.}291. In
addition, a new township and harbor, costing over $100 million, were
completed. The second-year development plan from 19b3 to 1970 was
more ambitious. Out of the total amount earmarked for the plan,
percent went into infrastructures, iU-.7 percent went into social
services and 12.5 percent went into education. (The execution of
these developments create not only wage-earning opportunities but also
encourage social mobility and bring about a more national-minded genera¬
tion of leaders.)2
Coupled with the economic modernization the educational program
moved forward. Education brings about opportunity for the less ad¬
vantaged and creates an environment to adhere to merit criteria without
3
reference to primordial or lineage attachment. Thus, between 1951
%ax F. Mallikan (ed.). New Nations: Their Growth and Development
(Boston: Little, Brown and ^o., 1961), pp.27-35*
detailed account of Ghana's seven-year development is found in




and 1961, the pritnaiy school output of manpower rose from 6,400 to
26,000; the technical school output from 719 to 858; the secondary
school output from 4l3 to 3,430; the university output from 6 to 148.
Over 75 percent of these students came mostly from the rural areas or
were the sons of the masses who would not ordinarily have had such
opportunities.
In summary, as the Indicators suggest, the Convention Peoples
Party was successful in promoting national integration due to the
following two factors. First, the party was able to increase norma¬
tive consensus^ among various social and historic groups, such as the
Ashanti-Northerners, chiefs-young men, intellegentsia-non-intellegentsia.
Second, the massive socioeconomic programs implemented by the party
between 1950 and 1961 and between 1963 to 1969 contributed greatly to
ameliorating the gap 1:^tween the elites and the masses. Small wonder
that, after I960, the term “Ghanaian" started gaining common currency
and was freely used instead of traditional expressions such as Ashanti,
Fanti or Ga. Even the change-over of government, because of the mili¬
tary coup in 1966, did not radically affect the new pattern of national
identification.^
The Nigerian Party System
In the main, Nigerian political pai*ties, as was pointed out earlier.
Normative consensus refers to a condition in which inter-ethno-
regional conflict is socialized.
2a recent public opinion poll listed over 60 percent of Ghanaian
citizens as favoring "Ghanaian" over other ethnic terms. See Legon
Observer. Vol. VIII, 1967.
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do not generall7 correspond with the consociational model except in
some few shared characteristics: a loose alliance on the national
level, lack of programmatic ideology, and lack of mass-party organiza¬
tion techniques (the assun^tion here is that mass party is trans-
ethnq-regional, and also capable of social mobilization). Specific¬
ally, the Nigerian parties can be described as single-party states,
each well entrenched in its own sectional base. To illustrate furHier,
the concept of the Nigerian consociational system^ and its relation¬
ship with integration calls for a brief narration on the historical
background of the parties, an evaluation of party membership and organi¬
zation, and finally a short discussion on the general orientation of
the parties toward economic development.
Nigeria, unlike ('hana, never developed an all-Nigerian political
party. In the late iPUO’s, the National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons (NCNC), came the nearest to being a national party, but it
became increasingly identified with the Ibo. The Action Group (AG)
and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NFC) were, from the outset, ethnic
parties. The AG was, in effect, a politicization of the Yoruba
cultural group I the very name of NPC left no doubt that it was a
regional party.
In 19U6, three governmental regions were created in the North,
East and West, leading to the adoption of a federal constitution.
Earlier, in 191h, these regions were amalgamated and had become the
^Other authors idio have attempted some classification of the
African political parties are Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties
(Penguin Books, London, 1961), p 16? ^d John Sklar, Nigerian Political
Parties (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).
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Crown Colony of Nigeria, a state (unitary form of government) that
continued until 1953* ^or almost ten years, 19^2 to 1962, each of
the three major parties, AQ, NCNC, and NFC, was dominant in its own
region and rooted in its main cultural linguistic group: Hause in
the North, Ibo in the East, and the Yoruba in the West* Each party
was the organic core of a political class defined to include those
who controlled the dominant institutions of a society — the tradi¬
tional elites.^
Both the NCNC and the AG relied on mass participation in the
communal sense, mostly centered in the areas with a high degree of
traditionalism* The communal participation became important during
the elections of 1951, the ilrst popular general election* The party
leadership saw that the support of the traditional institutions and
associations aligned with ethnic groups would be necessary for victory*
The NFC, on the other hand, was composed of traditional nobles, hereditary
rulers, merchants, and native administrative employees* Mass partici¬
pation was only encouraged for pragmatic reasons — to counteract the
growing influence of southern political parties in the North* Folitical
competition was a life and death struggle between the different cultur¬
al lingual groups*^
It is not surprising that during the series of independence-
constitutional confeirences, the parties occupied themselves with the
issue of tribal domination* Each of the major three parties favored
^Coleman and Rosberg, op*cit*, p*528*
2Ake, op*cit*» p.li^B*
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an arrangement that would ensure its control of its own region. Thus,
one can rightly infer that the very remarkable thing about the period
in which the constitution was being deliberated upon was the absence
of discussion on how far the constitution would affect the parties
and their leaders.
Significantly, the constitution granted vast powers to the federal
government. Representation to the federal legislature, the House and
Senate, were apportioned on the basis of population and equal-regional
representation, respectively. The bulk of the federal powers were
delegated to the House.
Given the obsessive fear of tribal domination, it is ironic that,
a constitution that set up a strong federal government that was bound
to be dominated by the Hausa-Pulani North was widely accepted by even
the non-Hausas. Ake is right in pointing out that "it appears that
the constitution was widely supported because it was generally misunder¬
stood.*^
For the time being, the paz*tles were in^ressed by the elaborate,
yet ineffective, provisions for regional autonomy embodied in the con¬
stitution. Each of the parties, AG, NCNC, and NFC, settled down to
ccnsolldating its power within its cwn region. In each region the
opposition was harassed. Local government councils that did not sup¬
port the ruling party were usually dissolved; electoral districts that
failed to return the candidates of the ruling party were denied the most
elementary social amenities. Within a short time each region was virtual-
^Ibid., p.lU5.
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ly a one-party state.^
Hie foregoing is a brief survey of the Nigerian party system:
outwardly i^ipearing as a national multi-party system, but in reality,
a cluster of three one-party states. )^t is moat apparent from the
survey is the absence of well defined ideology within the outlook of
the parties, and especially the lack of any planned program to increase
normative consensus among various groups of the country. In the face
of this, one may ask how the parties primnoted national Integration.
Qnploying the same empirical indicators as those used on Ghana,
an attempt will be made to identify briefly some of the supportive or
obstructive political developments that affected the pace and level
of national integration.
Unlike Ghana, Nigeria has considerable cultural-lingual hetero¬
geneity. Forces such as colonial rule's niggardly attempts to build
"united" Nigeria, size, and population all have intensified inter-group
differences. Thus, primordial attachment was stronger than in Ghana.
The influence of ethno-regionalisra was prevalent in the pre-independence
constituticsi, whidh brought federalism to Nigeria. Thus, federalism
meant a regional mon<^oly for each of the major political parties, and
the country and people were deprived of the opportunity to experiment
and share a new national political experience.
Again, unlike Ghana's experience, where the CPF achieved a
relative success in social mobilization, the leadership and membership
of the Nigerian parties was drawn mostly from the traditional elites.
^Coleman and - Rosberg, op.cit., p.653.
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Thus, the parties were not able to affect a horizontal linkage between
the masses and the elites. Consequently, the elite-mass gap was not
ameliorated.
Lacking well defined ideolc^ to give their following a central
perspective (an effective weapon in social mobilization), the parties
encouraged inter-elite rivalry. The NGNG, just before the 1966 coup
d'etat, was riddled with factions, while the AG was con^letely divided
between Awolowo and Akintola factions. Thus, the collapse of the
first Nigerian republic is said to have been precipitated by low-elite
consensus.
As has been pointed out, the traditional political system showed
a marked degree of homogeneity due partly to the presence of national
symbols such as chieftaincy, lineage and ancestral worship. In essence,
colonial rule and the emergence of plirral socities jeopardized these
integrative influences. In the light of this, some measures such as
bold and sensitive leadership capable of socializing inter-group conflicts
and able to generate some enthusiasm for national reconstruction would
have been expected from the political parties. Regrettably, there ware
no such attributes in the make-up of Nigerian political parties.
In addition to the foregoing overview of the Nigeria parties,
the membership and organization structure of the parties will now be
evaluated. Table 2 gives a summary of some of the major elections.
As this table suggests, Nigerial political parties were clusters of
one-party systems each well entrenched in their regional bases. Since
national Issues are not proper determining factors for the success of a
party in electoral contests, it would be extremely superficial if the
58
TABLE 2








Action Group 27.6 73
Others 8.1 16
Western Election, I960
Action Group 53.6 79
NCNC 36.2 33
NPC's ally 10.1 10
Northern Election, 1961
NPC 69.2 160
Action Group lU.6 9
NCNC'a ally IU.2 1
Eastern Election, 1961
NCNC 58.0 106
Action Group II4.U 15
Dynamic Party h»k 5
Independents 22.2 20
Source; Adapted from Coleman and jioseberg, op«cit«, pp»653~51*«
*Federal E-lections, 1959 s East, NCNC and Allies, 58, AG ll*. Others 2.
West, AG 33, NCNC and Allies 21, Others h* North, NPC 13U, AG 25, Others
8. Lagos, NCNC and Others 2, AO 1. See Journal of Commonwealth Political
Studies (November, 19h2), pp.l9U-210.
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attitiides of the masses vis-a-vis the party leaders were to be evaluated
OQ election returns alone. Another problem arises in making any posi¬
tive appraisal of masses-elite relationship, l.e., the inequitable
distribution of socioeconomic development. The first Nigerian republic
was notoriously marked with inequality in project development, as most
of the projects were centered in the south. Thus, the national econo¬
mic programs ihich promote wage earning and social mobility among the
people were lacking; therefore, the lot of the masses was not improved.
Leadership and Party Members
The ethnic group con^josition of the NPC leadership is predomin¬
antly Pulani. The religious distribution among the NPC is overwhelm¬
ingly Muslim. The NEPU (NCNC*s cohort in the north) leadership is
predominantly Habe and Muslim. The NCNC leadership is most cosmopoli¬
tan in its ethnic make-up, and both Christian and Luslim in its religi¬
ous distribution. '^e NCNC leadership is characterized as "organiza¬
tional intelligentsia, cosmopolitan celebrities, communal heroes, and
traditional notables." The most ingpbrtant of these, the organizational
intelligentsia, are educators, professional men, aid business leaders.^
The,: ascriptive nature of traditional northern emirate
leadership is basically a function of the rule that the
highest traditic»al office, emirship, is available only to
those eligible by birth to seek it, whereas all other offices
and titles are awarded primarily on the basis of kinship,
marriage, hereditary vassalage, or clientage (personal
allegiance) to the emir.^
Thus party leadership is composed primarily of hi^-bom native aulJiority
^Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., p.552.
^Ibid.. p.616.
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administrators, business managers and senior civil servants.
NEPU leadership reflects the party's ideological objective of a
radical democracy, in that the majority of the party leadership comes
from the lower rungs of society, the salaried clerks, the tec^ical
workers, and other educated native administration employees.
Party membership in most of the parties is comprehensive. Any
Nigerian can obtain membership in the NCNC and any Nigerian of northern
extraction may obtain membership in the NPC or the NEPU. But, in
reality, party membership of often aligned along ethnic and/or religi¬
ous affinity alone. AsjColeman.and Roseberg observe:
Membership or support may also be contingent on the position
of the party on issues of social conflict, endemic to the
class structure of a commercial town, which affect settler's
interests. Once individuals no longer perceive the social
order as sacred and inviolable, ethnic affinity does not
produce communal participation in the Gemeinschaft sense.^
By and large, the key feature of party politics in swithem
Nigeria is the reliance on mass participation in ths communal sense,
mostly centered in the areas with a high degree of traditionalism.
Ihis communal participation becomes important during the election of
1951, the first popular election of Nigeria. Party leadership soon
realized that the support of the traditional institutions and associa¬
tions aligned with ethnic ana religious groups would be a necessity for
victory. The first party to realize and utilize this factor was the
Action Group with the use of the "igbe Omo Oduduwa," a Yoruba cultural
^From Maurice Duverger's Analysis of the Quality of Participation,
based on Ferdinauid Tonnies' classic distinction between "Gemeinschaft"
(community) and "Gesellschaft" (society), ibid., p.620.
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organization.
The active membership in the NPC is composed of traditional
notables) hereditazy rvilersi merchants, and native administration employ*
ees. '*Mass support has been enlisted through appeals that make use of
both associational and communal principles of participation on the one
hand, and of both traditional and modern sentiments on the other
The party binds those vho seek the patronage, rewards, and compensations
that the party is able to dispense, and those who support the party
because of the traditional institution of clientage or personal allegi¬
ance to the traditional hierarchy.
The main path to solidarity and mass participation in many
northern areas, especially the emirates, is through Islam. Thus the
NPC constantly attempts to assert and strengthen the bands and ties of
Islam. "Inasmuch as the NPC is identified with fostering traditional
auhtority, and as traditional authority is religiously sanctioned,
party, faith and community may be convincingly portrayed as one."^
NEPU party membership is composed of those dissatisfied with
the traditional system and hierarchy. Members are usually town youths,
artisans, and small-scale trading interests. In the rural areas, H£PU
support comes from the "talakawa," the peasant who is dissatisfied with
the corrupt and poorly administered areas. NEPU's bid for mass support
centers around Habe and Fulani emnlty. It attempts to unite and
solidify Habe elements by "conjuring up glories of the past" before the
^Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., p.620.
2lbid.. p.622.
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coming of the Fulani conquerors. This is "called vestigal communal-
ism — a sense of an antecedant and morally preeminent community under¬
neath and beyond the existing one."^
Party Organization
NPC — Local Level
"The Northern Peoples* Congress is weakly articulated, widely
decentralized, and largely dependent upon the personnel of a non-party
administrative apparatus, namely, the Northern system of native admini¬
stration. The NPC is a "direct" individual membership party with
branches established at the ward, village, and urban/rural levels of
government. Branch activities are controlled by district committees,
and the key decision-making unit is at the divisional level depending
upon the province administered. In divisions that have one or more
traditional emirate, all policy matters come under the jurisdiction of
the lower branch corresponding to the emirate rather than to the divi¬
sion. Traditional administrative authority aid NPC leadership are often
exercised by the same personnel.
Federal and Regional Level
Supreme authority in the NPC is vested, by the constitution, in
its annual convention attended by its officers and the branch representa¬
tives. The constitution also provides for annual election of party
officers. The everyday direction of the party is controlled by the
National Working Committee — an ad hoc committee made up of national




Party policy formulation and discussion is centered in party caucuses
at the federal and regional legislatures. The National JSxecutive
Committee of the Congress is composed of the general officers, northern
regional officers, four members from each Northern province plus the
southern branches, and all NFC ministers. Party finances are controlled
by the Executive Committee.
Ancillary Elements
The two most inportant associations affiliated with the Northern
Peoples' Congress are the louth Association, and the non-enfranchised
Women's Section, "which renders service to the party by attracting the
enfranchised males.Trade unions, student societies, business assocla>
tions, and special interest groups, along with ten Kiddle Belt tribal
unions are other ancillary elements.
NCNC — Local Level
Similar to the NPC, the NCNC is a "direct" individual membership
party. Local branches are formed at the veudous local government
levels, but by designation a parliamentary constituency is the appro¬
priate unit of branch level. Each branch is to have a managing com¬
mittee made up of "the local branch officers, four representatives
from each member-union and ten other chosen at the general meeting of
the branch."2
Federal and Regional Levels
Supreme authority in the NCNC is centered in its national con-
^Coleman and iRosberg, op.cit., p.631.
^Sklar, op.cit., p.391«
ventlon held annually. Representation in this convention is extended
to branch representatives, members of the National Executive Committee,
and members of Parliament, plus special representation is extended to
representatives of the major ancillary organizations — the Women's
Association and the Zikist National Vanguard. Every representative
is entitled to one vote. Special conventions may be called by the
National Executive Committee or the Central Working Committee or upon
request by one third of the party's branches. The National Executive
Committee is conqposed of forty-two members, which includes the national
officers of the party. Though the National Executive Committee is
invested with full power, most major party decisions come from the
annual conventions rather than by Committee action. Nine national
officers of the party make up the Central Working Committee which was
created to "manage the affairs of the party between meetings of the
NEC."^
Ancillary Elements
The constitution of the NCNC provides for the organization of a
Women's Association, Youth Association, and the Zikist National Van¬
guard. They are forbidden to present candidates for election, they
are required to accept the guidance of the party, and separate member¬
ship cards are prohibited. They are allowed to have national organiza¬
tions, to hold annual conferences, and are represented at the party
convent! (XI. The WcTmen's Association c^erates on a regional basis,
and seeks a greater share in government; it slso campaigns for the
J-Ibid., p.398
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suffragette movement in the north. The Zikist National Vanguard
and the Youth Association seek to preserve the nationalist ideals of
the Zikist Movement.
Apart from the minor political parties of local origin, the
NEPU is the only affiliated party with a non-southern basis. These
minor local parties are not directly affiliated but are only coopera¬
tive partners; the only exception is the I^naraic Earty which is direct¬
ly affiliated with the NCNC.^
Approaches to Development
The Constitution of 195U transformed the structure of Nigerian
government from a unitary foundation to the existing bases of federal¬
ism. It was agreed that power should be divided between the federal
and regional governments which had evolved since 1954. Even so, there
were minor revisions in the 1958 independence Constitution. The
federal government's exclusive list included external affairs, defense;
higher education, control of industrial development, currency, customs
and excise. The regions were left with education, agriculture, roads
and industrial development. Each region was given the power to set
up its own marketing Board fcr its major crops and a development corpora¬
tion to encourage the establishment of new industries.
The distx*ibution of functions clearly aimed at preseirving all
mutual policy and administration for the regions, while external and
^bid., p.406.
2john P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics(Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press7 1966), p.JO.
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inter-regional traffic was left to the central government. Pragmatical¬
ly, the federal government, instead of assuming total control of the
economy, as found in most underdeveloped countries, left all financial
trading policies to the central government which allowed the regions'
actual economic development. Against this background, the regional
or the parties' orientation toward economic development will be
assessed.
Both the NCNC and AG profess socialistic articles of belief.
The basic orientation of the NFC is avowedly nonsocialistic. For some
reason, however, all parties have a nondoctrinaire attitude toward the
concrete problems of developments the need to attract private foreign
capital, overwhelming support for private enterprise by indigenous
Nigerians and the nationalistic outlook of Nigerian business elite to
support state measures to ensure indigenous control of natural resources.
Thus, all parties, in practice, pursue "mixed" programs idiich allow for
both private and public participation.^
In 195U, an international bank mission reccmunended the formation
of an Economic Mission Committee to prepare the development plan of
1955 to 1960.2 The outgrowth of this plan was the National Economic
Council, consisting of the premiers and ministers of finance or
economic development of each of the four governments in Nigeria.
The first major exercise in economic planning was a Development
Programme to cover the years 1962 to 1965. In announcing the plan in
^Ibid., p.6la.
p
^U.N.; The Economic Development of Nigeria (New York: Hopkins
Press, 19>F7^
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Parliament, the Federal Minister for Economic Planning observed:
The economic development of Nigeria could no longer depend on
the accidental relationship between on what each Government
decided in respect of economic planning within its own
jurisdiction, and that, therefore, every effort should be
made to draw up a national plan which would serve the needs
of Nigeria as a whole.^
The production of this Development Plan meant a great deal of
cooperation between the federaO. and regional governments and acceptance
by the latter of an overall national pattern. This plan, if it had
been executed, would have achieved unitary government in economic
matters•
To summarize, the following generalizations may be made by the
foregoing analysis of Nigerian parties and integration. !Ihe Nigerian
political parties are comprehensive membership groups. Theoretically,
any Nigerian may be a member of the AG, NCNC or the NPC. In practice,
party membership is greatly influenced by ethno-sectionalism. During
the final decade of colonial mile, millions of Nigerians were drawn by
the major political parties into the mainstream of national politics;
more than seven millions voted in the general elections of December,
1959.
Communal participation alignment on the basis of ethnic and
religious affiliation ~ has been extensively used. It became inqport-
ant during the elections of 1951, idilch obliged party leaders to enlist
the support of the peasantry, which was needed to supplement and sustain
local organization. Both the NCNC and the AG have artfully employed
^Federal Parliamentaiy Debates, 19b2~63 (3/28/62) cited by
Mackintosh, op.cit. . p.7li. Some aspects of this plan are mentioned
and discussed in the second section of the next chapter.
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this to win the traditional rulers to their sides*
NPC, on the other hand, is not synonymous with communal partici¬
pation. By and large, the active membership of the NPC comprises a
coalition of interests, including hereditary rulers, traditional notables,
elements with a higher educational level, well-to-do merchants and em¬
ployees of native administration. Mass participation exists through
appeals that utilize partly communal and associational participation
and partly traditional and modern sentiments, e.g., patronage and
spoils system.
Structurally, all parties have direct membership of individuals;
branches are formed on various levels of local government. The NPC
was widely decentralized. Fusion of the party with local administra¬
tive authorities was a means of spreading party organization. However,
the associational infrastructure (the fusion of party and ancillary
groups) was not as thorough as it was in Ghana.
In conclusion, the failure of Nigerial political parties to
achieve a relative degree of success in national integration was due to
undercurrents of these factors. There was an absence of cross-cultural
and regional movements to socialize inter-group conflicts. Significant
also was the lack of bold and imaginative social-economic developments,
at least on the federal level, to counteract the revolution of zasing
ejqpectations. On the other hand, suffice to say, the parties served
as the only vital link between the various sections of the country.
Specifically, the dissolution of the parties since the coup of 1966 has
^For a thorough discussion on the history of the Zikist Movement,
see Sklar, op.cit., pp.72-73.
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greatly Impeded social coramunicatlon aod social mobility.
CHAPTER V
NEOCOLONIALISM
"The greatest danger at present facing Africa is
neocolonialism."
Kwame Nj^rumah
A central thesis of some scholars and statesmen is that the
former metropolies have retained considerable political power in their
former territories by judiciously manipulating their economic holdings
in the newly independent countries* Such practices are sometimes
derisively referred to as neocolonialism and national Integration.
Before proceeding with the appraisal of neocolonialism and its
implications on national integration, some criteria for the analysis
will be stated:
1. A political system is malintegrated if there is a constant
threat of secession^ especially if the secessionist elements outnumber
those loyal to the system.
2. A society in which the government frequently resorts to extra-
constitutional measxires to assert its legitimacy is inviting the
vicious circle of extremism,^ hence, endangering stability.
^"Vicious circle of extremism" refers to a situation in :diich
every extra legal or constitutional measure of the regime is matched
by a corresponding measure, e.g., civil disorder, violence or bombing,
by the dissident grovp.
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In the light of these indicators, case studies will be made on
Ghana and Nigeria to asses: (l) hew neocolonialism influences seces-




Ghana, similar to the rest of the newly independent states, was
faced with staggering economic problems, accentuated by over-reliance
on a mono-crop economy (viewed as part of the colonial legacy). The
ruling Convention Peoples' Party, GPP, realized that the need to
modernize and satisfy the revolution of rising expectations called for
a quick and rspid economic growth, which entailed* diversifying the
economy, improving on existing economic infrastructure, and embarking
on a mass scale industrialization. In the course of raising the neces¬
sary capital for this economic reconstruction, the party had two courses
of action: to depend on domestic and private capital or to accept
foreign aid. Faced with these alternatives, the government invited in
a reputable international economist, Arthur Lewis to advise on a general
economic policy.
Since Lewis' report is the basis of Ghana's first seven years
development plan, the state of the country's economy before Lewis should
be discussed first and then its implication on the report should be
evaluated*
Unlike most of the newly independent states, Ghana, immediately
after independence, had 1;00 million pounds sterling locked up in short-
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term low-interest securities in London. Back home, the local banks,
all cwned by British companies, started disinvesting by transferring
most of their assets to their London or European headquarters.
Meanwhile, cocoa production, whose esqport sales have contributed
to over 60 percent of the country's Gross National Product throughout
the years, suffered a disastrous let-down, due to the fall in the world's
price level. The resultant overspending by the government and infla¬
tion was shattering.^ The other two sectors of Ghana's economy worth
mentioning are mining and manufacturing.
The country has been endowed abundantly by nature with extensive
mineral resources. These are gold, diamonds, bauxite and manganese;
unfortmiately for the country all three resources are foreign-owned,
due to the experience of colonial rule. The long-run importance of
the foreign-owned mines lies not only in the loss of Ghana's precious
minerals but also in the mine owners' refusals to help in readjusting
the wage structure (unchanged since 1938), in spite of consistent annual
profits by the mines and notwithstanding the increased cost of living.
(It is significant to mention that mining en^jloyes over 32 percent of
the total industrial workers.) The failure of real wages to show a
significant rise has had implications far beyond the mining industry.
Low wages, in view of the relatively large number of people the mines
employ, had prevented the growth of demand for the consumer goods and,
thus, retarded the development of the manufacturing industry and con¬
tributed to the maintenance of the country's traditional import and
^Walter Birmingham, et.al.(eds.), A Study of Con-temporaiy Ghana
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press,"I961), p.239.
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export patterns
Manufacturing is quite insignificant when compared to the cocoa
or mining industries. Constituting less than one percent of the nation¬
al products, it is centered around traditional arts such as goldsmithing,
blacksmithing and carving. ^ong the actual factories are a few li^t
industries owned by British and French companies. Independence brought
about no appreciable changes in these companies' modes of operation
and production. All that they did was to change from traditional
trading and buying of agricultural produce to specializing in assembling
and packing of European manufactured commodities. The point here is
that such activities are not conducive to a healthy economic growth
since they did not help in building much needed integrated industi*ies
which, in turn, could provide jobs for tiie growing number of elementary
and vocational school leavers entering the labor force. Thus, this
practice subverted the government's attempts to introduce' needed economic
reform.
Thus, one sees a meuiifestatlon of neocolonialistic attempts to
effect economic integration: the foreign banks systematically deflating
the economy, and mining and manufactviring failing to meet the demands
of real wages and employment, respectively. This attitude fits into
the concept of neocolonialism.
AgaiJist the background of the une3q>ected fall in cocoa prices^
and the reluctance of foreign conpanies to help in creating large scale
industries, how did the government react?
3-Ibid.
2Between 1958 and 1961, the world cocoa price fell frcxn 352 to
177 pounds sterling per ton.
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The government drew up the country's first seven-year develop¬
ment plan; however, this plan had no teeth. Lewis' strategy of
government passivity was so influential that it could be said that
Ghana had no economic plan.^
Governmental passivity in the area of the economy was shown
during the acute balance of payments crisis of 1961. In that year,
the deficit in government spending was about 12 percent of the GNP, due
to the increased import of nondurable consumer goods and the costs of
freight and insurance on them. The disinvestment by the foreign banks
in Ghana was another area of the government's apathy. Instead of en¬
acting laws to limit and regulate the outflow of the country's money on
imports as well as restrict deliberate attempts of the banks to deflate
the Ghanaian econoiry, .the government did practically nothing. The
rationale offered was that the government should not do anything to
undermine foreign confidence in investment in Ghana. In essence, the
government's hands were tied; it coxild not take stringent action calcu¬
lated to protect the country from exploitation by neocolonialists.
Events from this period, after I960, indicate (based on the author's
own experience) how the criticism by the opposition aid pressure from
the dissident group of GPP on the government mounted. This situation,
undoubtedly, was a fae:tor in promulgating the developti^nt of one-party
politics in Ghana. Thus, neocolonialism ushered in a situation in
which mutual coexistence among different factors of a society (well
integrated) became virtually impossible.
^Por a detailed analysis on the topic, see Bob Pitch, et.al.,
Ghana; The End of an Illusion (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961),
p.92.
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The crowning irony of the Lewis era was the inability to meet
or attract any foreign investment as the outflow of private capital
intensified.^ To make matters more favorable to the foreign interests,
the I960 Constitution included compensation to foreign capitalists in
case of nationalization, tax relief or tax holiday for capital invest¬
ments. In addition to these incentives, Ihere was free tax on raw
materials. In the light of this situation, >diat did the government
eventually do?
Government Economic Reforms, 1961-65
The government undertook two courses of action. First it signed
a bilateral trade pact (the Suppliers Credit System) with foreign
governments and businesses. Under this pact, a foreign government
undertook to complete a particular project and, subsequently, advanced
the necessary credit through a designated company, idaich would carry
out the actual project. Such credits were short-term and carried ex-
horbitant interest rates of 6 or 7 percent. Thus, Ghana, in 1961,
signed pacts with British and West German conpanies to supply roads,
railways, and harbor Installations. The upshot was inundation of infra-
structvire equipment, many of it nonsultable under local conditions, at
a cost of nearly 350 million dollars as against the country's total
revenue of 30 million dollars for that year.^ This is the year that
^Lewis enphasized that in order to reach the "take off" position,
the country needed an annual private foreign investment of $lii million.




the fall in cocoa prices accentuated Ghana's economic problems.
As the economy deteriorated due to too much reliance on foreign
aid and, especially, under increasing criticism of the opposition and
the CFP dissident groups, the government finally decided to "go it
alone." Thus, the second year development program was presented to
the country embodying among other things far-reaching economic reformsj
heavy outlays in capital goods, strict fiscal and monetary policies,
including restrictions on imports and outflow of money and the imposi¬
tion of a 5 percent surtax on all wages. Apparently, everything went
well, except that during the first month in which taxes on wages were
deducted there was a general strike.
The strike was suppressed by extra-constitutional means. The
government's use of force was matched by counter force by the dissident
group. Thus, the vicious circle of extremism had cane into being.
Ihe years between 1961 and 196U were, without a doubt, not a period of
stability.
To be sure, there is a cause and effect relationship between
neocolonialism and instability as the above narration Indicates.
Earlier, it was indicated how the GPP promoted national integratioi
by politicizing factions and socializing intra-group conflicts. However,
neocolonialism undid much of this by alienating workers from the party
and disz*upting communlcatioon between the government and the rank and file.
In summary, while this analysis may not be adequate to make a
definite correlation between the success of nation-building and neocolo¬
nialism , it can be affirmed that this narration has given some insight
into the relationship between neocolonialism and the problems of national
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integration. In brief, the notable feature of neocolonialism is its
capacity to bring about political instability. As in the case of
Ghana, the system brought about a wedge between the opposition^ and
the government, on the one hand, and between the government and the
masses, on the other. Thus neocolonialism was a factor in undermining
national integration.
Nigeria's Experience
In this section the author first will seek to indicate the nature
of the economic ties which exist and second, will review the role of
the foreign private firms ^hich, despite the attainment of political
independence, are continuing and even expanding their dominant position
in the commercial sectors of Nigeria.
The post-independence economic situation has two problems: the
internal problem of creating an economic climate conducive to attract¬
ing foreign investment and aiding government and private concerns, and
the external problem of association with the European Conanon Market
and Britain's entry ~ posing the question of Commonwealth preference
and the relation with territories of former French Africa. The applica¬
tions of these problems on Nigeria's post-independence situation could
be ascertained well by first examining the nature of the economic ties
with the former colonial power.
Nigeria, similar to Ghana, emerged from colonial rele with three
^The "opposition" here, refers to the national opposition group,
:^ich had been illegalized by constitutional amendment in 196U. Though
suppressed, the "underground opposition," whose ranks have been joined
by the dissatisfied intellectuals, became quite vociferous.
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million pounds sterling locked up in low-interest securities in British
banks. ‘^e country was split into three administrative regions loosely
coupled on a federal basisj 1his division severely hampered the overall
planned economic growth.^ Her-foreign trade was tied mostly with
European countries; her monetary system was linked with the sterling
areas. The existence of these problems, among other things, meant that
Nigeria could not disinvest her needed capital for internal development;
the exchange control earnings of the country being controlled in London
made it difficult for the country to diversify trade and affect pur¬
chase of necessary capital; and, finally, the many obstacles such situa-
p
tions pose in pan-African trade.
Externally, the application of Britain to join the European
Economic Community stirred up the Commonwealth countries, including
Nigeria. African members had reason to be the most disturbed of all,
for ten African states — former French colonies and Italian-speaking
territories — were already associated with EEC. While this meant a^
preferential market in Europe for associated members, no problem would
exist if Britain were not included. Nigeria was faced with the problem
of joining to promote e^qport with European markets for its products and
competing in sales to the market at par with the African primary producers
which were already associated members. The concomitant results for
Nigeria, in the long run, would be closer relations with Europe instead
^hana averted a similar situation by the resolute efforts of the
ruling Convention Peoples' Party, as was pointed out earlier.
^This is a universal phenomenon shared by all new nations of Africa.
See Ann Seidman, "The Economics of Neocolonialism," The Economic Bulletin
of Ghana. No.3, 196U. The relative size of Ghana and Nigeria in terms
of population, resources and ethnic composition may very well ejqplain the
relative success or failure of political leadership and national inte¬
gration in the two countries.
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of with Africa.
All this would reduce the possibility of any strong pan-Mrican
movement — economic and political ~ thereby destroying the dreams of
many Ajfrican countries, including Nigeria. As one Nigerian sums it
up: "How does Nigeria esqpect to preserve her independence and remain
trvie to her policy of non-alignment?'*^ Some statistics on Nigerian
foreign trade will give an explanation of this (see Table 3).
In foreign trade, the major exports of tin, coal, oil and iron
ore are being exploited by foreign companies, which use cheap African
labor to blast and ship overseas to the industzaal complexes of Europe
and America, a small percentage being shipped back as finished steel
products. The export of their profits will inevitably beccsne a drain
of capital desperately needed for development instead of contributing
2
to the rapid economic development of Nigeria.
Since World War II, the major foreign private oil firms have
discovered oil in unexpectedly extensive fields. The Shell B.P. group
has been involved in this project} the capital sums involved are esti¬
mated to total some 85 percent of the entire foreign private investment
in that country.
The general investment policy of European companies has been to
invest in newly discovered deposits of iron, oil, bauxite and tin,
paying for them in francs or pounds sterling and they could expect a
vast new market for French or British manufactured goods in the region.
^Claude S Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy







of total exports Country
Percentage of
Total Imports




France 3U.8 Prance 19.1
Belgium Belgium
Luxeii[)bourg Luxembourg
United States 7.3 United States 1*.U
Japan 1.1* Japan 10.1*
Others 5.U Others 20.2
1
100.0 100.0
Source: Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies (November,1961),
pp«13"3^» cited by Phillips, op.cit., p.ll2t«
* Note the heavy reliance on trade with Western Europe and the
challenges of the EEC. Trade with African countries amounted to
only one percent.
I
The United Africa Company claims to be an exception to the general
investment policies of foreign private firms. The company chairman of
UAC in Nigeria, at an official opening of the Kingsway store in Port
Harcourt, asserted: "We have changed from traditional trading and produce
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buying to specialized manufacturing and selling units and have established
a variety of industries which are situated throughout Nigeria.But,
in reality, UAC (affiliates of Uniliver, the second largest company ex¬
cluding oil firms in the United Kingdom, from the point of view of
assets and net income) is making a relatively small investment in its
new venture. The eleven light consumer goods industry projects planned
in Nigeria, the largest market area in Africa south of the Sahara, in¬
volve a capital investment of thirteen million pounds sterling — far
less than foreign firms are investing in the rich mineral resources of
the region. This exception hardly disproves the general thesis that
foreign private enterprise has invested primarily only in the extraction
of raw materials, not in the rounded industrial development necessary
to economic independence and higher living standards.
In view of this, the most logical action would have been nation¬
alization; however, the problem of creating an economic climate favorable
to attracting foreign investment and aid involves the question of
guarantee against nationalization in a more subtle sense. It also
means an assurance to the Anglo-American bloc that no radical communist
economic policies would be suddenly undertaken. The question of
nationalization, thou^ very pressing at that time, was not mentioned
in the election canpaign of 1959, notwithstanding the fact that both
the NCNC and AG were seemingly oriented toward socialism.
However, by 19b0, the movement of nationalisation, with its chief




the federal government was compelled to react. The course of action
taken was a prc^ram toward central planning.
The significance of the government's insistence that the internal
economic policy must be geared to the attraction of foreign aid and in¬
vestment was revealed in March, 1962, when the Six-Year Plan was re¬
leased. The plan calls for the expenditure of half a billion pounds
sterling, one half coming from foreign loans and grants.^ Further¬
more, for the total plan tdiich involves all four Nigerian governments,
the Minister of Finance asserted that the need for the other half of
the total expenditui^ must be realized through private foreign invest¬
ment during the six-year period. It was necessary, therefore, for
the government to make its internal economic policy unmistakably clear,
for the success of the plan would stand or fall depending on the degree
to which anticipated foreign aid are forthcoming.
Conclusion
It would be Expropriate to conclude this secti<xi by making
certain generalizations on the extent of the neocolonialist influences
on post-independence Nigeria. As has already been discussed, by the
time of political independence in I960, the Nigerian econon^y appeared
to have come a long way from the state of substantial external trade
dependence existing at the Amalgamation in 191ii (when southern and
northern Nigeria formally became a Crown Colony of Britain). Colonial
administration, no matter how rudimentazy, had begun to be the basis of
^Ibid., p.113. Among other things the Plan called for the
building of a new dam on Niger River, the building of a steel mill,
establishing a national development bank for regional industrial develop¬
ment, extension of electricity and other economic infrastructures.
national planning and development. ^here was rising optimism and
rising expectations to be fulfilled. Political Independence was consid¬
ered only as a means to an end. Although the ends were often e^qpressed
in unclear and vague nationalistic sentiments, independence was re¬
garded as incomplete without economic Independence.
However, the strength of the country in I960 also partially con¬
stituted its weakness. The rising expectations were not often matched
by sober and realistic appreciation of the inherent costs and diffi¬
culties. There was a built-in potential of national and personal
frustration, which the quality of political leadership was incapable
of forestalling and containing. There was a tragic dilemma that those
who fought for political freedom and inherited the state apparatus
were either unsuited for the Job or were exaggerating their roles in
national life.
By I960, the clouds of the eccmomic problem which the yoxuig
nation was to face were already gathering force. The free primary edu¬
cation program initiated in 1950 — an example of rjpid economic devel-
qpment through accelerated social programs — began to bear fruit.^
By independence, the results started trickling out of the school pipeline
into an empty market. The inherited administrative system had a "shop¬
ping" list approach planned to development and was incapable of facing
up to the real economic issues confronting the new nation.^
^Both Ghana and Nigeria anticipating independence at the end of
the decade, embarked on huge educational programs. The output was
more than was expected. Thus, unemployment became a serious problem
after independence.
^OJetunJi Aboyade, Foundations of African Economy (New York:
Praeger Inc.., 1966),, p.26.
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Indepeadence may be attained on a silver platter but the same
ingenuity cannot be performed on the economic front. By independence,
apart from a few superficial institutional manifestations of "economic
independence," a central bank^ with a national currency, a Mint, and
national airways, the Nigerian economy still maintained substantially
its colonial structure in spite of its new political outlook.
Nigeria's foreign policy was still heavily oriented toward the
major metropolitan power and was dictated by historic loyalty rather
than by economic rationality. As would be expected, the direction
of trade, all ancillary and servicing activities such as banking, finance,
and insurance fell neatly into line. Ihe bulk of private productive
investment was still in the hands of the metropolitan powers and still
heavily concentrated in the extracting industries and wholesale trading.
Above ail, there still existed an uncritical acceptance and application
of metropolitan thoughts, prejudices, policies and solutions to a wide
variety of problems confronting the econony. Such were the dimensions
of the neocolonialist strangulation on the economic and political life
of the new nation.
By end large, economic independence implies that the national
economic policy, the structural pattern of the economy, the dominant
mode of production and the economic ideology are made by the people
through their government and not by foreign interests.2 Meaningful
^Earlier in 1932, an advisor from the Bank of England had re-advised
against the formation of a State Bank of Nigeria, as being premature.
It was not until 19b0 when a state bank was finally established upon
the recomn^ndation of the United Nations. See UN : Economic Report on
Nigeria, op.cit.
2The resources available to, for example, Unilever-UAC and Shell
B.P, in Nigeria are by far greater than those controlled by any single
state in West Africa. See Seidman, op.cit., p.l2.
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econajjic independence is possible only if the national government is
stronger than any single interest group or combination of interest
groups, at least insofar as their activities on its territories are
concerned. Nigeria was in this plight.
The truth is that, positicxied as they are (lacking a strong central
authority), few states in West Africa, including, of course, Nigeria,
will be able to m\ister the resources to carry out the necessary struc¬
tural revolution, the essential reorientation of the economy to meet
the needs and aspirations of the people for n^aningful independence
and a higher standard of living; therein lie the dangers of neocolonial¬
ism.^
^Although this study has been limited to the period between 1952
and 19b5, i.e., tte pre-coup period, it is significant to mention
that the current Nigerian political crisis, the secession of Biafra
and its aftermath, the civil war, in some way Illustrates the intrigues
and machinations of neocolonialsm, as mentioned earlier in this chap¬
ter. The efforts of France and Britain to maintain and protect
their huge financial investments, the country's oil industries, has,
without doubt, precipitated and sustained the conflict to the present
day. For an interesting background discussion on the Nigerial civil
war, see Connor O'Bruise, "The Tragedy of Biafra," The New York Book
Review, December 29, 19b7.
CaiAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND OONCLUSION
The objective of this study has been to identify and to illuminate
the different dimensions of the problem of integration confronted by
the builders of the new states of Ghana and Nigeria. Drawing upon
many insists and a body of empirical evidence, the author will suggest,
in this concluding chapter, certain general facts regarding the political
restratification of the independent Ghanaian and Nigerian states and
the ways in which this in^jedes or facilitates the process of nation¬
building.
As has been indicated, the Yoruba and Akan societies were de¬
centralized bureaucracies with multiple social strata in which the
kingship structure was a unit of govemment. Theoretically, kingship
was absolute but, in practice, was controlled by certain checks and
balances. In addition to this there was the lineage which served as
an important element in sustainihg traditional social structxires.
The impact of colonial rule had an ambiguous effect on the tradi¬
tional political system as well as on the resulting "plural societies"
that were created. Firstly, the disintegration of the traditional
political system had far and wide repercussions which were carried on
into the post-independence era.
For instance, traditional roles and political recruitment based
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on membership, age, and sex, gave way to a new merit system based on
skill and education. Thus, a highly stratified society was eroded by
egalitarian tendencies. On the other hand, colonial rule had been the
most decisive factor affecting the process of political restratification
in Ghana and Nigeria, Its modernizing influences and the massive intact
of egalitarianism had been significant factors in bringing a sense of
unity into the highly pluralistic and heteregeneous Ghanaian and Niger¬
ian societies. Due to the modernizing influences of colonial admini¬
stration, significant numbers of persons had become "socially mobilized"
throu^ wage labor, urbanization aid commercialization of the econotny,
To be sure, though colonial rule did not institutionalize democracy, it
was, undoubtedly, responsible for the widespread Influence of the idea
of egalitarianism.
National Integration has been conceived as subsuming two broad
problems: vertical integration and territorial integration. The problem
of vertical integration aidses as a result of the effort to expand the
scale of political organization through voluntary associations, unions,
and across ethnic lines. As has been pointed out, vertical integration
is an outgrowth of the massive impact of modernization upon societies
dominated by traditional elites. Territorial integration is character¬
ized by a presence of primordial ties, that is, where individuals identify
themselves with certain cultural groups. In this regard, the goals of
political parties have been oriented toward minimizing interregional
tensions and discontinuities as well as bridging the social gap between
the elite and the masses.
In both Ghana and Nigeria there have been two diffewnt political
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systems which have attempted to carry out the foregoing function of
political restratification: the mobilization system and federal con-
sociational type. The differences between the two party systems are
both structural and psychological. Structurally, the mobilization
system seeks to absorb and control all forces of associational life in
the country; psychologically, it endeavors to create a climate of full
and continuous involvement and commitment on the part of the popizlation
regarding party-state goals. In contrast, the consociational systems
are struct\irally far less pervasive and all-embracing, for they tolerate
considerable associational and traditional pluralism. Psychologically,
they are far less demanding. Against this background and as our empir¬
ical evidence has euggestd, the Ghanaian political system was capable
of carrying out successfully national Integration due to the fact that
the country was able to evolve, after independence, a relatively mature
political culture. The Convention People's Party, as a mobilization
system, was txnily a national party with a symbolic leader and an ideology
which was able to socialize and politicize most of the regional and
ethnic differences. Corresponding to this, the party, through its
gigantic economic programs, was able to effect large-scale social modern¬
ization. In Nigeria, however, lacking a national party and in the
midst of centrifugal forces characterized by low-elite consensus, a
cynical atmosphere was created in -which regional differences were relent¬
lessly exploited by the elites. Thus, the failure of -the Nigerian
political systems in effecting successfully national integration was
due to a collapsed leadership and a lack of programs -bo effect social
cohesion among the various conflicting and disruptive forces of regional
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Interests.
The concept of tribalism, as mentioned earlier, has been used
invariably to describe some of the foregoing political conflicts in
Africa. A close study of political, systems and conflicts throughout
the Afro-Asian world, however, reveals a strong affinity toward pri¬
mordial Interests. In most of these countries, a close scrutiny of
the political conflict reveals an uncerpinning of "sectionalism,” or
"regionalism” and ”factualism,” but in a broader sense, ail these are
manifestations of "primordial” or "tribal” interests. Consequently,
the frequent resort to the concept of tribalism to describe political
conflicts in Africa is a gross oversimplification.
Political independence it has been discovered was only nominal as
it was not linlced with economic freedom. Many of the political
leaders, after independence, found that their country's economic system
was tied up with the former colonial countries. Aadically, forfeiting
their economic ties meant alienating the technical and financial sup¬
port of these countries. Taking the alternative meant leaving one's
countzy in perpetual economic bondage. Such was the dilemma of the
new nations. In was on this aspect of foreign economic entanglement
with the former colonial countries that the concept of neocolonialism
came into being.
The case study of Ghana has shown how the ruling party's efforts
to resolve the conflict almost disnxpted the short-run political stabi¬
lity tht political leaders had been able to achieve.
The case studies on Ghana and Nigeria indicate the extent to
which neocolonialism has influenced national integration. As it was
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pointed out, though Nigeria and Ghana have undergone dramatic changes
in their governments (the coup d'etats of January and February, 1966,
respectively), the resulting political development has taken different
turns; Ghana has enjoyed fairly stable political times, while Nigeria
has been thrown into a political turmoil — suffice to say that the
relative size, vast ethnic diversity of her immense population and the
tremendous natural resources puts the country to some disadvantage in
dealing with neocolonialism. All in all, Ghana and Nigeria share
similar political ttradition. Lacking adequate technical and highly
differentiated manpower resources as well as sufficient coital to
effect the social economic modernization, the two countries have
suffered and would suffer the intrigues and manipulations of neocolonial¬
ism in the short run. The long-run political stability would depend
on a condition in which the dominant mode of production and economic
developments are made by the government on behalf of the people and
not by foreign interests. Meaningful economic independence is pos¬
sible only if the national government is stronger than any single
interest group or combination of interest groups at least insofar as
their activities on the territories are concerned.
In conclusion, the problem ^Ich the concept of national inte¬
gration posed — how to increase normative consens\;is and effect social
mobilization without disrupting the short-run political stability ~
cannot be adequately evaluated by the four variables: traditionalism,
colonial legacy, pblitical party, and neocolonialism. The effort
by the author has been to "scratch on the surface" only. By the same
token, it is hoped that some light has been shed on the problem of
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national Integration and political instability in Ghana and Nigeria
and an arena for furture systematic e:q>loration has been provided.
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